- Center for Operation Research and Econometrics
(CORE) - Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
- Center for the study of the Organisations and Decisions in Economics (CODE) - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain
- Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (CES) - Université Paris 1, France
- Department of Economics - Universiteit Maastricht, The Netherlands
- Department of Economics - University of Warwick, UK
- Department of Economics - Vanderbilt University, USA
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Italy
- Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative
d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM) - Université de Marseille, France
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Italy
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) is a privately owned research institution
with an excellent international reputation in the field of economics. The
Venice office of the Fondazione was opened in 1996 in the Palazzo Querini
Stampalia. There are currently around twenty researchers studying sustainable
development of Venice and its lagoon, climate change and wetlands management.
Research on coalition formation, with specific applications to the analysis of international environmental agreements, is one of the main and oldest activities of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. In recent years, researchers and fellows of FEEM have published several articles and books on the existence of strategic incentives to sign an international environmental agreement even in the case in which the environmental good is public and emission abatement benefits all countries. The main reason for investing in this research direction is the increasing importance of international and global environmental problems, such as the greenhouse effect, the ozone layer, acid rain, the over-exploitation of marine resources, etc.. More recently, FEEM has started two new research projects: the elaboration of an applied model of economic growth embodying environmental constraints; the investigation of the role of network structures with respect to the efficiency and distributive features of international negotiations.
Local Research Team
Sergio Currarini (co-ordinator)
Associate Professor of Economics, Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia
- The Kinked Demand model and the Stability of Cooperation (2010), Economics Letters, 110: 223-225.
(with Marco Marini).
- Identifying the roles of race-based choice and chance in high school friendship network formation (2010),
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the U.S.A. (PNAS), 107, 4857-4861 (with Matt
Jackson and Paolo Pin).
- An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation (2009), Econometrica 77 (4), 1003-1045 (with Matt Jackson and Paolo Pin).
- Group Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Spillovers (2007), Mathematical Social Science, 54(3), 187-
- Network Design in Games with Spillovers (2007), Review of Economic Design, 10(4), 305-326.
- Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities (2006), Research in Economics, 60(2), 112-
119 (2006) (with F.Feri).
- Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies (2006), International Game Theory Review 8(1), 1-16
(2006) (with M. Marini).
Research Fields: economics and social networks, game theory and theoretical microeconomics, coalition formation, public economics, environmental economics.
Professor of Economics, Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia
- Bosetti V., C. Carraro, E. De Cian, E. Massetti and M. Tavoni (2013), ‘Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: an Integrated Assessment”, forthcoming in Energy Policy.
- 'International climate agreements with optimal mitigation and adaptation strategies', Carraro C. , M. Ferranna (2013), mimeo .
- 'Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties (with C. Marchiori and S. Oreffice), Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 42 No. 3, March 2009.
- Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements, FEEM Note di Lavoro no. 50, Coalition Theory Network Series, 2005.
- Game Practice ad the Environment, edited by Carlo Carraro and Vito Fragnelli, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004.
- The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, edited by C. Carraro,
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2003.
Research Fields: Environmental agreements, technological change, industrial organization.
Post doctoral Researcher, Marie Curie Research Fellow at FEEM
- “Endogenous timing in pollution control: Cournot-Nash versus Stackelberg equilibria”, Strategic Behavior and the Environment (2012): Vol. 2: No 2, pp. 133-158. DOI 10.1561/102.00000014.
- “International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions’ control”, Annals of Operations Research (2012). DOI 10.1007/s10479-012-1156-8.
- “International cooperation on climate change and innovation: R&D spillovers, absorptive capacity and abatement policy”, 2012.
- “The global emission game: on the impact of strategic interactions between countries on the existence and the properties of solutions”, 2012.
- “Efficiency versus equilibrium in a step level public good game”, with Willinger M., Mimeo.
- “Do people bluff?: An experimental investigation”, with Cottalorda P-J. and Willinger M., Mimeo.
Research Fields: Non cooperative game theory, environmental agreements, international spillovers, public and behavioural economics.
Phd student at Toulouse School of Economics and external researcher for FEEM
- 'Cooperation and efficiency in public goods experiments' (with A. Filippin and L. Lasio), mimeo, 2011
- 'International climate agreements with optimal mitigation and adaptation strategies', (with C. Carraro), mimeo, 2013
- 'Integration and International Cooperation: Formation of Multiple Coalitions with Heterogenenous Agents and Positive Spillovers', Master thesis, 2007
Research Fields: environmental economics, coalition theory, economics of uncertainty, experimental economics
Lecturer in Environmental Policy and Economics and external researcher for FEEM
- 'Bargaining and Devolution in the Upper Guadiana Basin' (with S. Stratton Sayre, and L. Simon), forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economics.
- 'Concern for Fairness and Incentives in Water Negotiations',Environmental and Resource Economics, 45 (4), 2010
- 'Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties (with C. Carraro and S. Oreffice), Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 42 No. 3, March 2009.
- 'Negotiating on Water: Insights from Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory (with C. Carraro and A. Sgobbi), Environment and Development Economics, 12(2): 329-349, 2007.
- 'Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness
(with C. Carraro and A. Sgobbi), World Bank Policy Research WP 3642.05,
Research Fields: Environmental Economics and Development , Water Resource Management , Climate Change , Game Theory, Negotiation Theory
Post Doc at London School of Economics and external researcher for FEEM
- The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management. Journal of theoretical biology, ISSN 0022-5193, with Schlüter, Maja and Levin, Simon (2011)
- Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108 (29). pp. 11825-11829. ISSN 1091-6490, with Dannenberg, Astrid and Kallis, Giorgos and Löschel, Andreas (2011)
- The wisdom of sustainable communities in the digital era: the case of efficient energy management, with Telesca, Luigi (2010). In: Rakocevic, Veselin and Stanoevska-Slabeva, Katarina and Telesca, Luigi, (eds.) Digital business: first international ICST conference, DigiBiz 2009, London UK, June 2009: revised selected papers. Springer , Berlin, Germany, pp. 119-129. ISBN 9783642115318
- "When fairness bends rationality: incorporating inequity aversion
in models of regretful and noisy behavior", presented at CTN Maastricht
(2009) & submitted to JPET
- "Water management and equity-driven ostracism maintenance of cooperation in a CPR subject to variable resource and social conditions", with S.A.Levin and M.Schlute (2009). Paper was presented at USSEE, Washington (2009) and FEEM-CEMCC-PEI, Venice (2009).
Research Fields: evolutionary dynamics and the evolution of norms; fairness
motives and other-regarding preferences; behavioral game theory and network