

coalition theory network newsletter

Issue No. 10-2008

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Editorial

by Frédéric Deroïan, GREQAM

Dear All,

In the year 2008 many conferences were good forums for discussing about strategic cooperation. Three recent events were: in June, a conference held in Barcelona in memory of Antoni Calvó Armengol; in July, the PET Seoul Conference and particularly one session organized for CTN papers; again in July, the Game Theory Society Conference in Evanston, which hosted many contributions on coalitions and networks. Trendy themes concern notably peer effects and influential agents, learning in networks, segregation issues, or the role of homophily in group formation.

These emerging theories may find further discussion through further empirical tests. These works should be discussed in future events, among which the 14th CTN workshop in Maastricht (early 2009).

We hope that you can find useful information in the current newsletter, and we wish you a pleasant read.

All the best,

Frédéric Deroïan

Announcement and Call for Papers

14th CTN Workshop MATCHING, COALITIONS, NETWORKS, AND BEHAVIOR

Maastricht, The Netherlands, January 23-24, 2009

→ http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/events/09_Maastricht/ctn14i.htm

→ <http://www.personeel.unimaas.nl/r.ilkilic/CTN2009.htm>

The Maastricht University CTN group (Department of Economics, UM-CTN webpage) will be organizing the 14th CTN Workshop in Maastricht, The Netherlands, on 23-24 January 2009. This workshop will present the state of the art of theoretical aspects in matching and coalition/network formation, behavioral foundations, and experimental validations.

Keynote speakers that have agreed to come so far are: Jacob Goeree (CalTech), Matthew Jackson (Stanford University), and Alvin Roth (Harvard University - to be confirmed).

Local organizing committee (Department of Economics, Maastricht University): Rahmi Ilkilic, Bettina Klaus, Arno Riedl, and Philipp Reiss.

Submissions of contributed papers are due by **November 15th** and the program will be announced on **December 15th**. Please send submissions to CTNworkshop2009@algec.unimaas.nl (Willeke Klein). Complete papers are preferred but abstracts are also welcome.

Papers will be selected by a committee consisting of representatives of the nodes of the Coalition Theory Network: Center for Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE) - Université Catholique de Louvain, Department of Economics - University of Warwick, Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (CES) - Université Paris 1, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Center for the study of the Organisations and Decisions in Economics (CODE) - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM) - Université de Marseille, Department of Economics - Maastricht University, Vanderbilt University.

Further inquiries should be directed to Ms Willeke Klein (CTNworkshop2009@algec.unimaas.nl).



Recent Events

Social Network and Peer Effects: Theory and Applications A Conference in Memory of Antoni Calvo-Armengol

Barcelona, May 29-31, 2008

The program can be found at the following link:

<http://www.iae.csic.es/investigatorsMaterial/a87511501780886.pdf>

CTN Session at PET 08 Seoul

Seoul, Korea, June 27-29, 2008

→ <http://www.apet.org/>

The Coalition Theory Network organised some sessions within the PET 08. CTN encourages the development and the circulation of new research on socio-economic networks and groups. This attains to

different aspects of social and economic systems, including the management of international public goods, to the governance of economic unions, to the formation of industrial cartels and collaborations, to the patterns of racial integration in social networks, the endogenous evolution and structure of institutions, etc.

Articles presented at Coalition Theory Network Session of PET08 Seoul

(Miguel Melendez-Jimenez: Session Chairman)

- *“Entrepreneurship, business groups and reputation”*

by **Raja Kali** (University of Arkansas) and **Nisvan Erkal** (University of Melbourne)

Business groups, constituted of firms in disparate industries, dominate the organizational landscape of many emerging economies. We develop a theoretical framework to consider the tradeoff between individual (firm) entrepreneurship and business group affiliation when there is instability in the legal and political institutions of the economy. If there is a high degree of instability in institutions, an individual firm may not be able to credibly commit to high quality, but a business group may, by pooling reputation across different markets. Business groups facilitate trade when individual entrepreneurship is not feasible, though if institutions improve, individual entrepreneurship crowds out business groups. We examine the conditions under which business groups form ab initio, and when they are formed by stretching the reputation of an existing firm. Our framework fits evidence from several emerging economies.

- *“Hacking-proofness and stability in a model of information security networks”*

By **Sunghoon Hong** (Vanderbilt University)

Abstract: We introduce a model of information security networks. A group of agents can form directed information links and use security systems called firewalls. Each agent benefits from direct or indirect information. However, it is costly to maintain an information link or a firewall. In this context, we introduce the probability of being hacked. If an agent is not secured by his firewall and obtains a large enough benefit, then he is attacked with positive probability and loses some fraction of his benefit. We then introduce the notions of stability and hacking-proofness. Stability requires that each agent maximizes his expected utility for a given network, while hacking-proofness requires that no agent is attacked with positive probability. We first present examples of stable networks, and study whether they are hacking-proof. Then we investigate their relation in a general context. As it turns out, under a certain condition, any stable network is hacking-proof. We also provide an upper bound of the probability of being hacked under a stable network.

- *“Cooperation, punishment and networks”*

By **Miguel Melendez-Jimenez** (Universidad de Malaga), **Enrique Fatas** (Universidad de Valencia and LINEEX) and **Hector Solaz** (Universidad de Valencia and LINEEX)

In this paper we design an experiment to study how the network structure of a group affects individual behavior in a team-work environment with the possibility of horizontal monitoring. Groups of agents repeatedly play a standard linear public good game in the lab and a network determines which members of the group each agent is able to observe. We consider four stylized networks: the complete network, the star, the line and the circle. We introduce a punishment stage once players have decided their contributions to the public good (à la Fehr and Gächter, 2000), being the punishment opportunities also determined by the network. For each network, we analyze how the possibility of (costly) punishment affects contribution levels and efficiency. We compare behavior across networks and across different types of players within each network. Finally, we present a simple behavioral model that captures many of the regularities observed in the lab.

Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society

Evanston, Illinois, USA, July 13-18, 2008

→ <http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/meds/games2008/schedule.html>

The following sessions may be of interest for the readers of this newsletter...

Session 4: Roommate and Marriage Models

- Pareto-Stability Concept: A Natural Solution Concept for the Roommate and the Marriage Models
Marilda Sotomayor

- The Roommates Problem Revisited
Thayer Morrill

Session 16: Networks IV

- Heterogeneity and Link Imperfections in Nash Networks
Pascal Billand and Christophe Bravard
- Strategic Communication Networks
Jeanne Hagenbach and Frederic Koessler
- Complementarities, Group Formation and Preferences for Similarity
Marcin Peski

Session 36: Networks I: Learning

- Bayesian Learning in Networks
Daron Acemoglu, Munther Dahleh, Ilan Lobel and Asuman Ozdaglar
- Rule of Thumb Learning in Networks
Daron Acemoglu, Angelia Nedic and Asuman Ozdaglar
- Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence, and the Wisdom of Crowds
Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson
- Social Networks With(out) Influential Agents
Lara Dolecek

Session 52: Networks II: Formation

- Contractually Stable Networks
Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
- A Strategic Theory of Network Status
Brian W. Rogers
- Limited Connections: Economic Foundations for a Preferential Attachment Model
Ana Babus and Aljaz Ule
- Congestion Games with Malicious Players
Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg and Christos H. Papadimitriou

Session 55: Discrete Matching Models

- Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts
John William Hatfield and Fuhito Kojima
- Benefits of Matchmaking in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Hanna Halaburda and Mikolaj Piskorski
- Dating and Updating
Jorge L. Garcia and Paula Jaramillo
- Coalitional Matchings
Dinko Dimitrov and Emiliya Lazarova

Session 62: Coalitional Games, Monotonicity, and Social Welfare

- Population Solidarity, Population Fair-Ranking, and the Egalitarian Solution
Youngsub Chun
- Monotonicity of Social Welfare Optima
Jens Leth Hougaard and Lars Peter Østerdal
- Aggregate-Monotonic Stable Solutions
Pedro Calleja, Carles Rafels and Stef Tijs
- The Cooperative Endorsement of Correlation
Penélope Hernández Rojas and José A. Silva-Reus

Session 77: Coalitional Games

- An Axiomatization of the Strong Constrained Egalitarian Solution
Francesc Llerena and Cori Vilella
- The Extension of Dutta-Ray's Solution to Convex NTU Games
Elena Yanovskaya
- Balanced Per Capita Contributions and Levels Structure of Cooperation
Maria Gomez-Rua and Juan Vidal-Puga

Session 79: Networks III: Formation

- Partners Heterogeneity in the Two-Way Flow Model
Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Jean Monnet and Sudipta Sarangi
 - Networks and Stability
Frank Page and Myrna Wooders
-

- [Existence of One-Way Flow Nash Networks](#)
Jean Derks, Jeroen Kuipers, Martijn Tennekes and Frank Thuijsman
- [Local Dynamics in Network Formation](#)
Jean Derks, Jeroen Kuipers, Martijn Tennekes and Frank Thuijsman

Session 84: Matching and Assignments

- [Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study](#)
Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn
- [Walrasian Equilibria of the Assignment Model](#)
Debasis Mishra and Dolf Talman
- Multi-Sided Assignment Games: Additive Games
Oriol Tejada

Session 88: Coalition Structures

- [The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Limited Communication Structure](#)
Peter Jan Jacob Herings, Gerard van der Laan, Adolphus Johannes, Jan Talman and Zaifu Yang
- [The Shapley Value for Games in Partition Function Form](#)
Michel Grabisch and Yukihiro Funaki
- Values for Partition Function Form Games
David Housman
- Graph Monotonic Values
Gerard Hamiache

Session 90: Social Preferences and Institutions I

- [Cooperation Among Strangers Under the Shadow of the Future](#)
Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari
- Recommendation Behavior and Product Choice
Miriam Mezger and Abdolkarim Sadrieh
- [Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks](#)
Stephen Leider, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat and Quah-Anh Do
- Group-Beneficial Behavior: An Unconventional Application of the Theory of Costly Signaling
Sascha J. Mohr

Session 91: Values of Cooperative Games

- Hierarchies Achievable in Simple Games
Josep Freixas and Montserrat Pons
- A Second Associated Consistency and Axiomatization of the Shapley Value for TU-Games: A Matrix Theory Approach
Theo Driessen
- Smoothing Values of Non-Differentiable Vector Measure Games
Omer Edhan
- Multilinear Extensions and Semivalues for Multichoice Games
Michael A. Jones and Jennifer M. Wilson

Session 96: Networks IX

- [Robustness of Networks in the Threshold Game - in Favour of Non-Hierarchical, Heterogeneous Networks](#)
Kris De Jaegher
- [Noncooperative Networks in Multimarket Oligopolies](#)
Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi
- [Farsightedly Stable Networks](#)
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Session 121: Networks V: Communication and Beliefs

- Extensive Communication and the Madness of Crowds
Stefano Demichelis and Maria Saez-Marti
- [Beliefs in Network Games](#)
Willemien Kets
- [Communication Networks in the Multi-Player Electronic Mail Game](#)
Kris De Jaegher and Stephanie Rosenkranz
- [Strategic Information Extraction Through Networks](#)
Antonio Jimenez-Martinez

Session 132: Core and nucleolus

- Extension of the Core and the Nucleolus to Games in Partition Function Form, Not Necessarily Superadditive
Roger A. McCain and Taylor Distinguished
- The Core of Set Games
Hao Sun and Theo Driessen
- The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games
Jingang Zhao
- The Monoculus of a Coalitional Game
Marco Slikker and Henk Norde

Session 135: TU Coalitional Games

- The Shapley Value for Games with Restricted Cooperation
Emilio Calvo
- Leximals, the Lexicore and the Average Lexicographic Value
Yukihiko Funaki, Stef Tijs and Rodica Branzei
- The Restricted Harsanyi Set for Games with Ordered Players
Rene van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan and Valeri Vasil'ev

Session 139: Networks VI: Games

- Strategic Substitutes and Networks
Yann Bramoullé, Rachel Kranton and Martin D'Amours
- Local Interactions on Graphs: A Pairwise Approximation Approach
Thomas Gall and Markus Kirkilionis
- Information Trading in Social Networks
Andrei Karavaev
- The Impact of Degree of Cooperation on Braess's Paradox
Eitan Altman, Amar prakash Azad and Rachid E-Azouzi

Session 172: Networks VII: Bargaining and Allocations

- Bargaining on Networks
Mihai Manea
- A Sensitive Flexible-Network Approach
Noemí Navarro
- Measuring Trust in Peruvian Shantytowns
Dean Karlan, Markus Mobius and Tanya Rosenblat
- Social Networks and Unraveling in Labor Markets
Itay P. Fainmesser

Session 183: Networks VIII

- Two-Stage Myopic Dynamics in Network Formation Games
Esteban Arcaute, Ramesh Johari and Shie Mannor
- How to Connect Under Incomplete Information
Dinko Dimitrov and Claus-Jochen Haake
- Efficiency Bounds for Sequential Wireless Resource Allocation Auctions
Junjick Bae, Eyal Beigman, Randall Berry, Michael Honig and Rakesh Vohra
- Repeated Games Played in a Network
Markus Kinateder

Session 201: Segregation

- Schelling Redux: an Evolutionary Dynamic Model of Residential Segregation
Emin Dokumaci and William H. Sandholm
- A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation
Sebastian Buhai and Marco J. van der Leij
- Tipping and Residential Segregation: A Unified Schelling Model
Junfu Zhang



Article

Risk-taking in social networks (work in progress)

by Mohamed Belhaj and Frédéric Deroïan, GREQAM

Recent theoretical advances in the understanding of optimal decisions on economic and social networks emphasize the notion of Bonacich centrality. Two basic ingredients are required to generate Bonacich centrality. First, "local" interdependencies in the returns of own effort are required; typically assume that the direct neighbors matter. Second, specific utility functions generate linear reaction functions. Then, for small interactions, one may obtain a unique equilibrium, in which individual efforts are proportional to a Bonacich centrality measure.

Ballester, Calvo and Zénou (*Econometrica*, 2006) proposed a pioneering work in economics, in which agents choose a level of effort on a network under linear quadratic utility function (Interestingly, Calvo, Zénou and Patacchini, 2006, conducted -successful- empirical tests of the theory in the context of individual performance at school). Recently, Ghiglino and Goyal (2008) exhibit a similar pattern in different context: that of a pure exchange economy containing a positional good. One originality is that centrality influences the levels of consumption both directly and indirectly through price effect (the price of the positional good depends on the average Bonacich centrality).

Mohamed Belhaj and I are pursuing this line of research. We give an idea of our current works under the form of two remarks.

The first one concerns the generality of the results mentioned above, the second one is related to a third possible application of Bonacich centrality.



1. For sure, one limitation of the results is that Bonacich centrality is associated with very specific utility functions. To some extent, analyses are very general with regard to the networks analysed, but quite restrictive with regard to utility functions. In short, if we perturbate utility functions, what holds, what vanishes? In a recent working paper, we present a set of networks on which the ordinal ranking associated with Bonacich centrality is preserved for both a wide range of utility functions and a wide set of externalities. In this paper, we have restricted our analyses on a subset of networks, but we gain generality in the primitives of the model.
2. In a current work, we obtain a new possible application in which Bonacich centrality may apply. The context is the recent theoretical advance about risk-sharing on networks (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007, 2008; Bloch, Genicot and Ray, 2007). We propose to make the risk faced by individuals endogenous to their decisions; that is, agents choose a level of risk in a context of social insurance. In our model, the individual levels of risk at equilibrium are described as a Bonacich centrality measure of the network of social insurance. This analysis may have policy implications in development economics or in finance.

NEW PAPERS ON COALITION AND THEORY NETWORK**FEEM & CTN Working Papers**

20.08

Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations*Michael Finus, Pedro Pintassilgo, Marko Lindroos and Gordon Munro*

21.08

On Policy Interactions Among Nations: When Do Cooperation and Commitment Matter?*Leopold von Thadden and Hubert Kempf*

22.08

Repeated Games Played in a Network*Markus Kinateder*

23.08

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation*Hideo Konishi and Taiji Furusawa*

24.08

Opportunity and Choice in Social Networks*Paolo Pin, Silvio Franz and Matteo Marsili*

25.08

R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly*Vasileios Zikos*

26.08

Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations*Hans-Peter Weikard and Rob Dellink*

27.08

The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games*Jingang Zhao*

28.08

A Network Model of Price Dispersion*Giacomo Pasini, Paolo Pin and Simon Weidenholzer*

29.08

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-sided Matching*Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon and Wouter Vergote*

30.08

Network of Commons*Rahmi Ilkilic*

31.08

A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation*Marco Van Der Leij and I. Sebastian Buhai*

32.08

The Sixth Framework Program as an Affiliation Network: Representation and Analysis*David Frachisse, Pascal Billand and Nadine Massard*

33.08

Dynamic Models for International Environmental Agreements*Michèle Breton, Lucia Sbragia and Georges Zaccour*

41.08

Multiple Membership and Federal Structures*Alexei Savvateev, Michel Le Breton, Valery Makarov and Shlomo Weber*

45.08

Coalitional Matchings*Dinko Dimitrov and Emiliya Lazarova*

61.08

Networks with Group Counterproposals*Ricardo Nieva*

62.08

Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy*Michael Finus and Dirk Rübbelke*

65.08

Does Network Matter in International Expansion? Evidence from Italian SMEs*Luca Petruzzellis and Antonia Rosa Gurrieri*

CES Working Papers

2008.11

Externalities, Consumption Constraints and Regular Economies*Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Elena L. Del Mercato*

2008.21

A Structure Theorem for Graphs with No Cycle with a Unique Chord and Its Consequences*Nicolas Trotignon and Kristina Vuskovic*

2008.22

Trade, Conflicts and Political Integration: Explaining the Heterogeneity of Regional Trade Agreements*Vincent Vicard*

2008.23

The Four-in-a Tree Problem in Triangle-Free Graphs*Nicolas Derhy, Christophe Picouleau and Nicolas Trotignon*

2008.28

Workers Behavior and Labor Contract: An Evolutionary Approach*Victor Hiller*

2008.40

Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains*Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding*

CORE Working Papers

2008/15

Interdependent Preferences in the Design of Equal-opportunity Policies*Juan D. Moreno-Ternero*

2008/16

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-sided Matching
Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote

2008/17

Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Complete Information Revelation in Dynamic Analysis
Tanguy Isaac

2008/18

Axiomatic Resource Allocation for Heterogeneous Agents
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero and John E. Roemer

2008/23

Optimal Ownership in Joint Ventures with Contributions of Asymmetric Partners
Marco Marinucci

2008/25

Market Integration in Network Industries
Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Cecilia Vergari

2008/26

Decentralization of the Core through Nash Equilibrium
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras and Nicholas Ziros

2008/33

Does the Absence of Competition in the Market Foster Competition for the Market? A Dynamic Approach to Aftermarkets
Didier Laussel and Joana Resende

Maastricht University (METEOR) Working Papers

RM/08/003

Collective Choice Rules on Convex Restricted Domains
Ton Storcken

RM/08/010

Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets
Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn and Markus Walzl

RM/08/017

Non-cooperative Collusion and Price Wars with Individual Demand Fluctuations
Erik Pot, Ronald Peeters, Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen

RM/08/018

Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution
Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

RM/08/019

Behavioral Effects in Individual Decisions of Network Formation
Marjolein J.W. Harmsen-van Hout, Benedict G.C. Dellaert and P. Jean-Jacques Herings

RM/08/020

Competition Against Peer-to-peer Networks
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ronald Peeters and Michael Yang

University of Warwick Working Papers

WP 836

Moral Hazard, Bank Runs and Contagion
Shurojit Chatterji and Sayantan Ghosal

WP 840

Chain-Store Competition: Customized vs. Uniform Pricing
Paul W. Dobson and Michael Waterson

WP 844

Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-elite Conflict
Sayantan Ghosal and Eugenio Proto

Vanderbilt University Working Papers

08-W02

Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter
Francis Bloch and Ben Zissimos

08-W06

Conformity, Equity and Correlated Equilibrium
Edward Cartwright and Myrna Wooders

08-W08

Settlement
Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum

08-W10

Accounting for Persistence and Volatility of Good-Level Real Exchange Rates: The Role of Sticky Information
Mario J. Crucini, Mototsugu Shintani and Takayuki Tsuruga

GREQAM Working Papers

2008-02

Search Externalities with Crowding-out Effects
Bruno Decreuse

Forthcoming events**→ IAREP/SABE 2008 Meeting at LUISS in Rome**

Rome, Italy, 3 - 6 September 2008

The annual colloquium attracts specialists from psychology, economics, business administration, marketing and consumer behavior.

Submissions closed.

→ Second International Training Workshop on Econometric Modeling and Data Analysis

Famagusta, North Cyprus, Turkey, 8-12 September 2008

Second International Training Workshop on Econometric Modeling and Data Analysis 2008 (SITWEMDA 2008) is organized by International Economic Society (IES) for academicians as well as professionals from public and private sectors. After completing the first International Training Workshop on Econometric

Modeling and Data Analysis 2007, IES is now proud of offering this second event. Econometric modeling and data analysis preserves its prior importance in academic sector to publish high quality papers in top ranked international peer reviewed journals and to contribute to research related courses as well as theses in graduate levels. Econometric analysis is also important in public and private sectors for forecasting and estimation about future trends. Having the importance of econometric modelling and data analysis, IES now organizes the second ITWEMDA Series to train and improve the skills of academicians in publishing high quality papers and train professionals to do forecasting in their job markets through the latest econometric and statistical modeling techniques. By attending this training program, participants will also be able to collaborate in publishing joint papers for high quality and international peer reviewed journals such as the ones in Social Science Citation Index.

→ **CLAIO 2008 Meeting on game theory in honor of Guillermo Owen on the occasion of his 70th birthday**

Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 9-12 September 2008

The CLAI0 2008 will be a multidisciplinary event that will serve as an international meeting point for scientists, university professors, technology providers and end users; with the objective of sharing successful experiences and to impart their knowledge among its participants. Beyond its academic nature, the CLAI0 2008 will feature a technology fair of solutions related to Operations Research and administration sciences, which will be a part of the encounter of internationally recognized technology providers and industry leaders. On the other hand, CLAI0's organization committee will have the presence and assistance of the most recognized academic professionals, practitioners and researchers, from Latino America and the rest of world, in the different areas of the Operations Research sciences. This will give CLAI0's participants a great chance to interact with the most brilliant mathematical minds, apart from having the opportunity to witness, at first hand, the latest academic and technological advances in these topics.

→ **First Workshop on Dynamics, Optimal Growth and Population Change: Theory and Applications**

Milan, Italy, 18-19 September 2008

The Workshop aims at bringing together researchers working between economics and mathematics (with a special focus on economic growth and development) and at creating a research network for future joint projects and collaborations. Possible topics of the Workshop include:

- Dynamic programming with applications to optimal growth
- Population dynamics and growth
- Mathematical modelling for economic demography, development and vintage capital
- Theories of human capital and growth
- Innovation and growth
- Technological progress, technology diffusion and growth
- Institutions, intellectual property rights and growth
- Patents and growth.

Submissions closed.

→ **General Equilibrium and Strategic Interactions: Theories and Applications**

Nanterre, France, 25-26 September 2008

Recent developments in general equilibrium theory focus on strategic interactions. Several models offer strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Others analyze the functioning of markets and the working of market power in economies where competition takes place on multiple markets among many agents. This workshop is devoted to recent developments in the field.

→ **1st ICC Conference on Network Modeling and Economic Systems**

Lisbon, Portugal, 9-11 October 2008

The 1st ICC Conference on Network Modelling and Economic Systems will be held in Lisbon, October 9-11, 2008, as part of the Institute for Complexity Sciences (ICC) activities. The Institute for Complexity Sciences supports research in Complexity domains, promoting knowledge in interdisciplinary subjects. The program will consist primarily of contributed papers. The program committee will be chaired by João Ferreira do Amaral of the Research Unit on Complexity and Economics (UECE) and Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão (ISEG) of the Technical University of Lisbon. The ICC-NMES conference includes a Special Session on Applications: while the main part of ICC-NMES is methodologically oriented, this half-day session focuses

on applications to various areas of economics: primarily, the structure and formation of R&D collaboration networks are focused on, but also contributions from other areas, such as techno-economic networks, innovation networks, social capital, and finance are welcome.

Paper Submission Deadline: closed.

→ **Workshop on Frontiers in Game Theory and Networked Control Systems**

Cambridge, MA, USA, 10-12 October 2008

This workshop aims at creating a strong interface among game theorists, economists, computer scientists, operations researchers, and engineers by bringing together leading researchers from each field. To realize maximum interaction among the participants, the workshop will feature seven sessions organized around the key themes of the emerging subarea of game theory and networked control systems. These seven sessions will be on:

- Cooperative control, consensus, and game-theoretic perspectives
- Competition and cooperation in networked-systems
- Learning in games
- Computational game theory
- Mechanism design and applications in networked-systems
- Social networks
- Foundations of game theory

→ **The 4th East Asian SIAM Conference**

National Institute for Mathematical Sciences (NIMS), Daejeon, Korea, 10-12 October, 2008

The 4th East Asian SIAM Conference will be held at the National Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Daejeon, Korea on 10-12 October 2008.

Paper Submission Deadline: 20 September.

→ **2008 European Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society**

Cambridge, UK, 31 October – 1 November 2008

The 2008 European Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society will take place at Churchill College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom, from October 31 to November 1. The Programme Committee consists of the Regional Consultants with Professor Richard J. Smith as Programme Committee Chair. Senior members of the Econometric Society may propose candidates to the consultant of their region. Candidates are PhD students or recent PhD graduates who are intending to go on the job market during academic year 2008-9. Eighteen participants are selected by the Regional Consultants to present their research and to discuss the research of the other participants at the meetings. The selection of participants proceeds in two stages. In the first stage each Regional Consultant selects one participant from his/her region and proposes a shortlist of candidates. In the second stage the remaining ten participants are elected by the Regional Consultants from these shortlists.

→ **Complexity**

Irvine, CA, USA, 12-15 November 2008

Complexity arises when there are large fluctuations, active components, nested feedback loops, and multiple layers of system dynamics. Complexity poses urgent problems that involve basic science, engineering, and medicine, which may have major societal impact for complex systems such as ecosystems, financial markets, communication networks and biology. Common terminology/taxonomy among researchers and practitioners involved with complex systems is necessary so that interdisciplinary synergies can be created. This conference on complex systems will bring together a wide range of scientists, engineers, medical professionals, economists, philosophers, as well as individuals from public and private funding institutions and the science media to explore complexity.

→ **II World Conference of the Spatial Econometrics Association**

New York, USA, 17-19 November 2008

Spatial Econometrics is becoming more and more popular in many scientific fields. The 2nd World Conference of the Spatial Econometrics Association aims to bring together economists, econometricians and regional scientists to discuss the present achievements and future challenges and opportunities. The conference will be held on 17-19 November 2008 at New York Marriott at the Brooklyn Bridge, NY.

→ 5th Pan-Pacific Conference on Game Theory

The University of Auckland, New Zealand, 19-21 November 2008

The 5th Pan Pacific Conference on Game Theory will be held at the University of Auckland, New Zealand on 19-21 November 2008. It is an annual conference of game theorists from the Asia-Pacific region. This will be the first time that the conference has been held in Australasia.

→ 2nd Workshop on Game Theory in Energy, Resources and Environment

HEC Montréal, Canada, 20-21 November 2008

The 2nd Workshop on Game Theory in Energy, Resources and Environment will be at the University of Montréal, Canada, on 20-21 November 2008.

Topics of interest include applications of game theory to:

- Electricity and gas (market design, investment decisions, imperfect competition models, regulation, etc.)
- Oil industry (international markets, competition in retail markets, etc.)
- Resources (fisheries, renewable and non renewable resources models, etc.)
- Environmental economics (international agreements, sustainability, etc.)

→ 2008 Latin American Meeting of The Econometric Society (Lames)

Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, 20-22 November 2008

The 2008 Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society (LAMES) will take place in Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, November, 20-22. The meetings are jointly hosted by Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV/EPGE) and Instituto Nacional de Matemática Pura e Aplicada (IMPA) and will take place at IMPA. The 2008 LAMES will run in parallel to the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA). Registered participants will be welcome to attend all sessions for both meetings. Economists and professionals working in related fields, including those who currently are not members of the Econometric Society, are invited to submit theoretical and applied papers in all areas of economics for presentation at the Congress. Each author may submit only one paper to the LAMES and only one paper to the LACEA. The same paper may not be submitted to both the LAMES and LACEA Congress. At least one co-author must be a member of the corresponding Society or Association.

Submission Deadline: 30 September.

→ 2008 Winter WEHIA (Workshop on Economics with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents)

Taoyuan, Taiwan, 5-7 December 2008

The Joint Conference of the Winter WEHIA2008 and the CIEF2008 will be held at Kainan University, Taoyuan, Taiwan, during December 5-7, 2008. This Joint Conference will provide a worldwide stimulating forum for researchers, educators and students in the fields of social sciences, business, computer science, and information science to disseminate their new research findings and exchange information on emerging areas of research in the fields. It will also create a pleasant environment for interdisciplinary conversations among the participants with similar or even dissimilar research interests.

Paper Submission Deadline: closed

→ WINE2008 - 4th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics

Shanghai, China, 17-20 December 2008

Over the past decade there has been a growing interaction between researchers in theoretical computer science, networking and security, economics, mathematics, sociology, and management sciences devoted to the analysis of problems arising in the Internet and the worldwide web. The Workshop on Internet & Network Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results arising in these varied fields. The 4th edition of WINE will take place in December 2008, at Shanghai, China.

→ 2009 North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society

San Francisco, CA, USA, 3-5 January 2009

The 2009 North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society will be held in San Francisco, CA, from January 3 to 5, 2009, as part of the annual meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations. The program will consist of contributed and invited papers. It is hoped that the research presented will represent a broad spectrum of applied and theoretical economics and econometrics. The program committee will be chaired by Steven Durlauf of University of Wisconsin–Madison.

→ Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Protection

University of California, Santa Barbara, USA, 24-25 April 2009

The workshop is being organized by Charlie Kolstad and Matthew Kotchen and will be held at the University of California, Santa Barbara on April 24-25, 2009. The aim to assemble leading scholars with work relevant to international agreements, voluntary programs, and voluntary actions as they relate to environmental management. The organizers intend to draw on a diversity of fields within economics, including environmental, international, industrial organization, behavioral, and public economics.

Paper Submission Deadline: January, 5

→ GameNets 2009 - International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, 20-22 May 2009

This conference, which will be held on the campus of Boğaziçi University, in Istanbul, Turkey, will bring together researchers who apply game theory to analyze, design, and assess the performance of networks. The organizers hope to highlight synergies between various related research areas and encourage discussions regarding the benefits and limitations of game theory as a performance assessment and design tool for networks. Both the application of game theory to networking problems and the development of new game-theoretic methodologies that can be applied in that context are of interest. The conference will feature plenary talks, organized sessions focused on specific topics, and contributed papers.

→ Visit the CTN Members' seminars web pages**CODE:** <http://idea.uab.es/code/workshops.htm>**CORE:** <http://www.uclouvain.be/en-43617.html>**CES:** http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/seminaires_ces.htm**FEEM:** <http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Seminars/default.htm>**Greqam:** <http://greqam.univ-mrs.fr/seminars.php>**Maastricht:** <http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/meteor-seminar-et>**Vanderbilt:** <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/seminars-research.htm>**Warwick:** <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/forums/>
News, Publications and Job announcements**→ Visit the CTN website "Job announcements" page at http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/80_job.php****→ Book:** Social and Economic Networks, forthcoming from Princeton University Press
by Matthew Jackson<http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8767.html>


About CTN

The Coalition Theory Network (CTN – <http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/>) is an association of eight high level scientific institutions, aimed at the advancement and the diffusion of research in the area of coalition formation. The six current members are:

- Center for Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE) - Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
- Department of Economics - University of Warwick, UK
- Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (CES) - Université Paris 1, France
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Italy
- Center for the study of the Organisations and Decisions in Economics (CODE) - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain
- Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM) - Université de Marseille, France
- Department of Economics - Universiteit Maastricht, The Netherlands
- Department of Economics - Vanderbilt University, USA

Members contacts:

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<http://pareto.uab.es/code/>

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:: CORE

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