


# Coalition Theory Network Newsletter

## Issue No. 4

### Contents

▪ Editorial	2
▪ PET 2005 Marseilles – CTN contribution	3
▪ A workshop on game theory and engineering	4
▪ New papers on coalition theory	6
▪ Recent and forthcoming events	9
▪ News, Publications and Job announcements	11
▪ Visitors at CODE	13
▪ Visitors at FEEM	13
▪ About CTN	14



## Editorial

by Sergio Currarini

Dear CTN members,

This edition of the Newsletter contains reports from recent events, the announcement of several exciting upcoming conferences and workshops related to the theory of games and of coalition and network formation. As usual, you will also find a complete list of the most recent working paper publications by all of CTN members and by the Grandcoalition website. We also invite all of you to look at the programme of the Vigo SAET conference, where four sessions dedicated to social interaction and network theory were held.


We also would like to thank all those who helped FEEM in its effort to raise funds to keep improving our annual meetings, and to start a series of summer schools related to the topics of coalition and network theory.

New trends and directions of research seem to be emerging, especially in the field of network formation, that suggest exciting developments and a more and more interdisciplinary approach to our field of research. This makes us confident that the activity of the CTN will keep growing and attracting new scientists from various fields.

Let me thank all those who contributed to this issue of the Newsletter and to the improvement of the CTN website's contents. According to the statistics we collected from February to May 2005, the CTN web pages received more than 33.000 visits. Of course, more contributions are always welcome. In particular, research questions, ideas, comments, short papers could be disseminated. I do hope that the next issue will be even richer and more interesting.

A good, relaxing and productive Summer to all of you,

Sergio Currarini



## PET 2005 Marseilles – A report of CTN Sessions

by Sergio Currarini

PET 05 Marseilles ([www.pet2005.org](http://www.pet2005.org)), in conjunction with the Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet and sponsored by GREQAM-IDEF & Université de la Méditerranée (Aix-Marseille II), was held in Marseilles, on June 16-18th, 2005.

This edition hosted two special sessions on Coalition and Network Theory, that have been organised as a special CTN activity. I would like to take this opportunity to Thank Silvia Bertolin, Myrna Wooders, Guillaume Haeringer and Frédéric Rychen who worked with me for the organisation of the sessions.

### **Dinko Dimitrov** **"A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games"**

Dimitrov's paper presents a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. Hedonic games have the characteristic that agents have preferences defined only and directly on the coalition the composition of the coalition they belong to. The paper focuses on the existence of two of the new stability concepts – contractual Nash stability and weak individual stability. The existence of the latter is shown by providing sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of strong individual stability that implies weak individual stability. Sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and strong individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games are also provided.

### **Hans-Peter Weikard** **"Cartel Stability under an optimal Sharing rule"**

Weikard's paper extends the theory of stable cartels to the case of heterogeneous players. Stable cartels are defined by internal and external stability, requiring that no member wishes to leave the coalition and that no outside player wishes to become a member of the coalition. The main results is that under positive externalities, the presence of heterogeneous players may lead to the formation of the grand coalition, contrary to the prediction of previous works in the literature. This possibility is

illustrated by means of a public good example, to which the specific assumption of the paper apply.

### **Gerald Pech** **"A Coalition Dominance Approach to Party Behavior"**


Pech's paper studies the relative performance of voting systems with majority voting (MV) on one hand and proportional representation (P R). The paper models parties as coalitions of agents who pursue similar political objectives. Forming a party offers a commitment device for agents to act together according to an agreed decision making procedure. The novelty of the paper is that when forming a party, agents have to be forward looking so that they are able to form expectations over the impacts of their move on future voting outcomes and policy decisions.

Pech employs a forward looking solution concept, in which only such outcomes can be used to block considered moves which are either stable themselves or which are an element of some cycle. This is apparently obtained as some variation of Ray and Vohra's Equilibrium Binding Agreements, although it is not completely clear how the concepts are related.

The main conclusions are that the consequences of Proportional Representation (PR) depend on the attitude of the government. If the government is one of political change, P R moderates policy outcomes. If it defends the status quo, PR is likely to be more conservative.

### **Jean-Christophe Péreau** **"Bargaining with non-monolithic players"**

This paper studies a model of bargaining in which one of the two parties can break up into several parties during the bargaining process. Possible examples are international negotiations between blocks of countries. The model is set in an incomplete information setting, in which an uninformed party has to make an offer to an informed party, which can strategically split up as a response to the proposals. The paper shows that the presence of a non monolithic informed player increases the chances to obtain an agreement while



it reduces the chances of a significant amount of transfers from the leader to the informed party. This because the possibility of scission implicitly implies that the informed party loses the advantages that it had from its private information.

It follows that the informed party may benefit from committing not to implement any kind of scission after negotiations have started.

### CTN SESSIONS AT PET05 - PROGRAMME

**Saturday, June 18, 2005**

**CTN SESSION 1: 11.30 – 13.00**

Parkash Chander, *National University of Singapore*

**[The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation](#)**

Dinko Dimitrov, *Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University*

**[A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games](#)**

Hans-Peter Weikard, *Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University*

**[Cartel stability under an optimal sharing rule](#)**

**CTN SESSION 2: 14.15 – 15.45**

Alessandro Cigno, *Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato, University of Florence*

**[The family as an intergenerational coalition: a constitutional approach](#)**

Gerald Pech, *Department of Economics, National University of Ireland Galway*

**[A Coalition Dominance Approach to Party Behavior and the Moderating Effects of Proportional Representation](#)**

Jean-Christophe Péreau, *University of Marne La Vallée*

**[Bargaining with non-monolithic players](#)**


### A workshop on game theory and engineering

by Fioravante Patrone

The 9th of June 2005 it has been held a one-day workshop at the Mathematical Department of the Polytechnic of Milan (Italy), under the heading: "Game Theory and Engineering". The workshop was proposed by Roberto Lucchetti (from the Polytechnic of Milan) and has been organized with the collaboration of Fioravante Patrone (from the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Genoa).

Aim of the meeting was to offer an occasion for discussing applications and results in game theory that have special relevance for the themes suggested

from engineering problems. The organizers do believe that there is room for a significant development of the interface between engineering and game theoretical methods, approaches and results. Actually, one of the goals of the meeting is to stimulate a network effect among researchers in the Faculties of Engineering that use game theory. The number of attendants (and their characteristics: mainly master or PhD students, and young researchers) has been an encouraging signal to pursue such a goal. To this end, it is already planned to organize a second meeting, in Genoa, in autumn.



The workshop has seen three plenary lectures (by S. Tijs, J. Sánchez Soriano and F. Patrone), plus communications from V. Fragnelli, E. Guerci, S. Marchi e R. Tadei.


The opening conference from Tijs (University of Genoa and of Tilburg) has been devoted to a survey of classical game theoretical applications and to a brief description of specific projects in which he was involved (telecommunications: phoning from planes; logistics: sharing transport costs along the Rhine, problems in the harbor of Rotterdam). Sánchez Soriano (University of Elche) has devoted his talk to discuss potential and actual applications of Game Theory to System and Management Engineering problems. The talk was divided in two parts. In the first one, applications to management issues were presented: the 3G-auctions, the rank-auctions in Internet Search Services, and the Spanish Electricity Market. The second part was focused on telecommunication problems, in particular radio resources management, offering several game theoretical approaches to power control, link adaptation and channel allocation problems. Patrone has introduced a couple of issues: one is the analysis of microarrays using game theoretical tools (in particular, “power indices”), that offers at the same time a completely new approach and an additional tool for the analysis of microarray data (joint work with S. Moretti and S. Bonassi); the other one is the development of software agents which conform to the protocols specified by FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) in the context of auctions (joint work with V. Mascardi and D. Roggero). In his talk, Patrone has also emphasized the role of a sound game-theoretical background, to avoid a naïf or disputable use of game theoretical tools, providing a couple of illustrative examples.

The talk of Fragnelli (University of Eastern Piedmont) has been devoted to “Joint Project Management”, with a special emphasis on the ways in which additional costs (in particular, penalties) or extra savings should be divided among the participants to a project, on the basis of their failure to respect their deadlines, or on their ability to save time w.r.t. those allocated by the contract. The results were obtained jointly with R. Branzei, G. Ferrari and S. Tijs.

The communications of S. Marchi (Polytechnic of Milan) and E. Guerci (Faculty of Engineering, University of Genoa) were addressing the behavior of the “electricity market”, more specifically of the “day ahead” power exchange. Both of the approaches emphasized the role of a dynamic, multi-period analysis. In particular, Marchi (“Market power and collusive behavior in electricity auctions: comparing static and repeated game approaches”, joint work with S. Cotta Ramusino), has compared different bidding strategies in different auction formats, according to static and dynamic gaming. Guerci (“Multi-agent power exchange based on reinforcement learning: Discriminatory vs. uniform auctions”, joint work with S. Cincotti., S. Ivaldi, M. Raberto) has emphasized the role of bounded rationality (stemming from a statistical analysis of actual trades in the Spanish electricity market) and has offered results from a simulative approach based on a couple of learning processes: “adaptive evolutionary learning” and “reinforcement learning”.

The talk of R. Tadei (Polytechnic of Turin) was on “Multidisciplinary Optimization - Local Search and Game Theory Integration” (joint work with B. Amata, E. Beccari, F. Della Croce, G. Fasano, V. Fragnelli, M.F. Norese, S. Palamara, S. Riva). This work was intended as a test of the possible results which an integrated approach with different methods can lead to. A space mission analysis problem was tackled using Combinatorial Optimization, Game Theory and Multicriteria Analysis. The first part was aimed at obtaining data through local search methods, mainly Pareto optimal solution; in the following this set of solution was studied using Game Theory and Multicriteria Analysis. The result on this simple model encourages further research as well as a stronger integration of the different methods.

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
## New papers on coalition theory

### FEEM Working Papers

- ❑ 155.04 - [An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities](#)  
*Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus*
- ❑ 10.05 - [Cost-Reducing Alliances and Local Spillovers](#)  
*Frédéric Deroian*
- ❑ 23.05 - [Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria](#)  
*Michael Finus, Pierre v. Mouche and Bianca Rundshagen*
- ❑ 25.05 - [The Core of Directed Network Problems with Quotas](#)  
*Somdeb Lahiri*
- ❑ 34.05 - [Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation](#)  
*Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Rahmi Ilkiliç*
- ❑ 35.05 - [Network Formation With Endogenous Decay](#)  
*Francesco Feri*
- ❑ 36.05 - [Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and Network Formation Games](#)  
*Frank H. Page, Jr. and Myrna H. Wooders*
- ❑ 41.05 - [Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements](#)  
*Aart De Zeeuw*
- ❑ 65.05: [Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues](#)  
*Carlo Carraro, Carmen Marchiori , Alessandra Sgobbi*
- ❑ 66.05 - [Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness](#)  
*Carlo Carraro, Carmen Marchiori , Alessandra Sgobbi*
- ❑ 77.05 - [Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule](#)  
*Hans-Peter Weikard*
- ❑ 78.05 - [Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game](#)  
*Joëlle Noailly, Cees Withagen, Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh*
- ❑ 79.05 - [Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game](#)  
*Joëlle Noailly, Cees Withagen, Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh*

### CODE Papers and Working Papers

- ❑ UAB-CSIC WP 634.04  
[An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments \(Revised Version\)](#)  
*David Perez-Castrillo & David Wettstein*
- ❑ UAB-CSIC WP 638.05  
[Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism](#)  
*David Perez-Castrillo & Robert F. Veszteg*



- ❑ UAB-CSIC WP 641.05  
[Efficient Bidding with Externalities](#)  
*Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein*
- ❑ UAB-CSIC WP 647.05  
[Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a three-agent economy](#)  
*David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein*

### **EUREQua Working Papers**

- ❑ 2005.11 - [Does the Distribution of Emission Permits Matter for International Competitiveness?](#)  
*François Fontaine*
- ❑ 2005.12 - [On the impossibility of preference aggregation under uncertainty](#)  
*Thibault Gajdos, Jean-Marc Tallon, Jean-Christophe Vergnaud*
- ❑ 2005.30 - [Endogenous order of speech in expert committee. Who wants to speak first ?](#)  
*Nicolas Houy & Lucie Ménager*
- ❑ 2005.31 - [Consensus, Communication and Knowledge : an Extension with Bayesian Agents](#)  
*Lucie Ménager*

### **University of Warwick Working Papers**

- ❑ 719 - [Who Really Wants to be a Millionaire? Estimates of Risk Aversion from Game Show Data](#)  
*Roger Hartley, Gauthier Lanot and Ian Walker*
- ❑ 720 - [Voting Power Implications of a Unified European Representation in the IMF](#)  
*Dennis Leech and Robert Leech*
- ❑ 722 - [Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes](#)  
*Bhaskar Dutta, Hans Peters and Arunava Sen*
- ❑ 723 - [Communication Networks with Endogeneous Link Strength](#)  
*Francis Bloch and Bhaskar Dutta*
- ❑ 724 - [Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and Network Formation Games](#)  
*Frank H. Page Jr, and Myrna H. Wooders*
- ❑ 725 - [Local Network Externalities and Market Segmentation](#)  
*A. Banerji and Bhaskar Dutta*

### **GREQAM Working Papers**


- ❑ 2005-04 [Endogenous fluctuations in two-country models](#)  
*K. Nishimura, A. Venditti, M. Yano*
- ❑ 2005-12 [Political cycles : a suggested interpretation](#)  
*P. Gautier, R. Soubeyran*
- ❑ 2005-15 [Cheap talk, Gullibility and welfare in an environmental taxation game](#)  
*H. Dawid, C. Deissenberg, P. Sevcik*



- ▣ 2005-18 [Négociations multilatérales entre entreprises hétérogènes : la loi du plus fort ou l'union fait la force?](#)  
*S. Thoron*
- ▣ 2005-19 [A new approach of convergence in clusters : sigma-convergence in clubs of economies](#)  
*H. Chevrou-severac, V. Marimoutou*
- ▣ 2005-20 [Articulation of hierarchy and networks as an evolving social structure](#)  
*J. Rouchier, E. Lazega, L. Mounier*
- ▣ 2005-21 [Bilateral collaboration and emergent networks](#)  
*R. Cowan, N. Jonard, J-B. Zimmermann*
- ▣ 2005-24 [Communication networks with endogenous link strength](#)  
*F. Bloch, B. Dutta*

**New papers that were recently posted at [www.grandcoalition.com](http://www.grandcoalition.com)**

- ▣ [Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem](#)  
*Johan Eyckmans and Henry Tulkens (published)*
- ▣ [Coalition Strategies and Reduction of GHG Emissions](#)  
*Vihang M. Patel*
- ▣ [Stable International Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution with Ratification Constraints](#)  
*Sergio Currarini and Henry Tulkens*
- ▣ [A Network Formation Game with an Endogenous Cost Allocation Rule](#)  
*Nobuo Matsubayashi and Shigetaka Yamakawa*
- ▣ [Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control](#)  
*Marc Germain, Philippe Toint, Henry Tulkens, and Aart de Zeeuw*
- ▣ [Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration](#)  
*Utku Unver*
- ▣ [A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues](#)  
*Federico Echenique and Mehmet Yenmez*



## Recent and forthcoming events

- ❑ **First Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory**  
**Maastricht, The Netherlands, 24 - 26 June, 2005**  
<http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/sing/>

From Friday, June 24, to Sunday, June 26, 2005, the first Spain Italy Netherlands Conference on Game Theory (SING 1) took place in Maastricht, The Netherlands. This way, The Netherlands is inserted in the existing alternating sequence of outstanding game theory conferences organised in Spain and Italy.

- ❑ **4th Twente Workshop on Cooperative Game Theory**  
**Enschede, The Netherlands, 28-30 June, 2005**  
<http://wwwhome.math.utwente.nl/~driessentsh/workshop2005/>

Following the sequence of three Twente workshops on cooperative game theory (1996, 2002, 2004), the 4th Twente workshop was held June 28-30, 2005.

The Dutch-Russian one-day symposium on Tuesday June 28 is fully dedicated to presentations by Russian and Dutch researchers in the framework of the ongoing research-cooperation between the Russian Federation and The Netherlands, as approved by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).

- ❑ **The Stony Brook Game Theory Festival of the Game Theory Society**  
**Stony Brook, NY, USA, 11-22 July, 2005**  
<http://www.gtcenter.org/Default.php>

From 1990 to 2004, the International Summer Festival on Game Theory at Stony Brook has been a renowned academic gathering of researchers from all over the world. This year the events will be a part of the Game Theory Society activities.


The Festival Events:

- The 16th International Conference on Game Theory July 11-15, 2005
- Workshop on Law and Economics July 17-19, 2005
- Workshop on Game Theory and Computer Science July 20-22, 2005

- ❑ **Voting Power Analysis with Reference to Institutions of Global Governance: the Fourth VPP Workshop**  
**Radcliffe, UK, 20-22 July 2005**  
<http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/71news.html>

The fourth VPP workshop will take place in Coventry (University of Warwick) from 20th to 22nd July 2005 on the theme of voting power analysis with special emphasis on its application to the institutions of global governance. The Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) has kindly agreed to act as sponsors this year.

Conference topics: reform of the IMF voting system to improve the representation of developing countries; the Kyoto protocol; the IMF constituency system; power implications of unified EU representation in global bodies; the EU draft Constitution. And also technical/ methodological papers on such topics as: theory of voting power measurement; computational aspects of voting power measurement; comparison of power indices; cooperative game theory analyses of voting bodies; power indices for normative and positive analysis of institutions; the Penrose Square Root Rule; constitutional power versus behavioural power measurement; the Shapley Value; the effect of electing institutions under various voting procedures on the distribution of voting power among their members; the effect of voting-power considerations on the formation or dissolution of partnerships or political coalitions; etc.



▣ **Workshop on Stochastic Methods in Game Theory**

**Erice, Italy, 24 September- 2 October 2005**

<http://web.econ.unito.it/scarsini/Erice2005/>

This workshop aims at giving an overview of the interaction between stochastic methods and game theory. Probability is central in the theory of choice under uncertainty. In game theory, where several decision makers interact, the presence of uncertainty adds a further complication, since different players could have different opinions, and therefore employ different probability measures to make their strategic decisions. The relatively recent consideration that economic agents do not have infinite cognitive abilities and do not possess full information about their environment raises new challenges, that need a treatment through advanced and innovative mathematical tools. The conference will put a special emphasis on the following topics:

- Bounded rationality: models from computer science such as automata or Turing machines are used as a representation of agents with limited cognitive abilities.
- Asymmetric Information: the modeling of asymmetric information and the study of games with incomplete information relies on tools from probability theory and information theory.
- Learning: agents with bounded or unbounded rationality may ignore other players' strategies at the beginning, but learn them through the course of interaction.

▣ **Informatics 2005**

**New Orleans, USA, 13-16 November 2005**

<http://www.informs.org/Conf/NO2005/>

The discipline of operations research emerged in response to a need to make better decisions and find superior ways to allocate limited resources. Since its inception, operations research has made many substantive contributions to the solution of problems in environmental recovery, industrial ecology, green engineering, reverse logistics, sustainability, and environmetrics. The conference program will reflect the beliefs that our discipline's interdisciplinary approach to problem solving is ideally suited to such problems, and that operations research will take on an increasingly important role in the utilization and distribution of critical natural resources as they become scarcer.

The focus will be on the role operations research can play in the interaction between ecological concerns and economic growth. As a natural outgrowth of this theme, the conference program will also emphasize the importance of the relationship between basic research and the practice of operations research.

▣ **International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics**


**Hong Kong, 15-17 December 2005**

<http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/%7Ewine2005/>

The Workshop on Internet & Network Economics (WINE 2005) will take place in Hong Kong, December 15-17, 2005. This interdisciplinary (Computer Science, Economics, Mathematics, Operations Research, etc.) conference intends to provide a forum for researchers working in Internet and Network Economics and related topics and to exchange innovative ideas and to be aware of each other's efforts and results.

Topics of Conferences: Ad hoc networking and communities, algorithmic game theory, algorithmic mechanism design, auction algorithms and analysis, computational general equilibrium and approximation, coordination and collective action, digital goods and information markets, e-commerce payment and exchange protocols, economics of internet security, fixed point algorithms, indivisible goods equilibrium, incentive compatible protocols, price differentiation and price dynamics, pricing models for network congestion protocols, reputation systems, social networks, software system pricing, strategic data mining, and other related topics.

**Submission of Papers deadline: July 3, 2005**



## News, Publications and Job announcements

### ▣ **JOB ANNOUNCEMENT: Post-Doc Research Fellowship in Microeconometrics**

EUREQua is part of a RTN (Research Training Network) sponsored by the EC on : "MICRODATA". EUREQua offers 1 post-doc research fellowship. The fellowship is a two-year position. PhD graduates in the field of microeconometrics are welcome to apply.

For more info, please contact: Professor Jean-Marc Robin : [jmrobin@univ-paris1.fr](mailto:jmrobin@univ-paris1.fr)

### ▣ **JOB ANNOUNCEMENT: Positions in Econometrics**

The faculty at the California Institute of Technology invite applications for two positions specifically in the field of econometrics at any level, assistant, associate, or full professor. The position(s) are tenure-track at the assistant professor level and either tenure-track or tenured at the associate level. At the untenured level, the term of initial appointment is normally four years, and is contingent upon completion of the Ph.D.

The faculty will consider outstanding candidates doing research in any econometric subfield(s), theoretical, applied, or both. Special interest is for candidates who would thrive interacting with social science faculty doing interdisciplinary research in areas common to economics, political science, history, law, and public policy.

Further information at <http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/74news.html>

### ▣ **JOB ANNOUNCEMENT:**

- **1 Postdoctoral/senior researcher, "International (Environmental) Relations/Global Governance" (for 3 years)**


- **2 PhD candidates "International (Environmental) Relations/Global Governance" (for 4 years)**

The Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam invites applications for three new positions for an interdisciplinary research programme that will investigate the emergence, effectiveness and legitimacy of transnational public-private and private-private governance arrangements in global sustainability policy. The empirical focus of the programme will be on the several hundred new Partnerships for Sustainable Development agreed upon in 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Methodologically, the programme will combine qualitative and quantitative research, including analysis of a Global Sustainability Partnerships Database and a series of structured case studies. The programme will run from 2006 through 2009. It is funded by, and part of, the Shifts in Governance programme of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. The postdoctoral/senior researcher within the programme is expected to also contribute, with about 50 percent of her/his time, to a work package on post-2012 climate policy within a major new integrated project of the European Union.

All three positions will be hired in international competitions. IVM plans to launch the programme, with all positions filled, by 1 January 2006 (earlier start is possible).

Further information at <http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/73news.html>

**Deadline for applications is 31 July 2005.**



#### ▣ **AWARDS FOR DOCTORAL FIELDWORK**

The Economy & Environment Program for SE Asia (EEPSEA) provides awards to cover the costs of fieldwork required for doctoral degree programs. The awards are open to nationals of EEPSEA member countries who intend to remain in or return to Asia following completion of their studies. Member countries are Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, China, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka.

The awards cover the costs of fieldwork for up to one year, including one return economy class airfare. Requests for tuition or stipends will not be considered. Awardees will be eligible and, in fact, are encouraged to apply for subsequent EEPSEA research awards, after completing their studies and returning to work in Asia.

Where feasible, applicants will be invited to one of EEPSEA's biannual research workshops.

There are no fixed deadlines for applications.

Information about application procedures can be obtained from

[http://www.eepsea.org/en/ev-7730-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.eepsea.org/en/ev-7730-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)

#### ▣ **JOB ANNOUNCEMENT: Postdoc in Economics**

The Department of Economics at Göteborg University, Sweden seeks applications to postdoc scholarships in Economics. We welcome applications from candidates with a recent PhD in all areas of economics. Candidates must demonstrate substantial potential for performing important academic research and also the potential to teach effectively. These positions commence in year 2006 (with some flexibility). The appointment is two year non-tenure track, but could be turned into a tenure track position.

Applications should include a current CV with written summary of scientific, teaching, administrative, and other qualifications relevant for the position and the names of three references whom we may contact. One set of at most 10 scientific publications and at most 10 other publications reflecting teaching skills (like textbooks, other teaching materials, editorials and contributions to popular magazines etc.) should be included.

More detailed information about the position can be obtained from the Chairman of the Department of Economics, Prof. Lennart Hjalmarsson, tel. int+46/31/773-1345, email [Lennart.Hjalmarsson@economics.gu.se](mailto:Lennart.Hjalmarsson@economics.gu.se)

The application must be received by **September 1, 2005**, sent to: Chairman, Department of Economics, Göteborg University, P.O. Box 640, SE-405 30 Göteborg, Sweden


#### ▣ **NEW WEBSITE AND BLOG ON ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS**

John Whitehead and Tim Haab are excited to announce the launch of ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS. A website and blog dedicated to accessible writings on environment and natural resource issues written by economists. ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS can be found at [www.env-econ.net](http://www.env-econ.net).

On the site you will find news, opinions, overviews of recent research and much more. All postings are accessible, non-technical writings by expert economists. The site will appeal to students and members of the public interested in what economists have to offer in the analysis of environmental issues. If you are interested in posting to the site please follow the instructions on the site.

Questions, comments or suggestion can be sent to:

[tim@env-econ.net](mailto:tim@env-econ.net) or [john@env-econ.net](mailto:john@env-econ.net).



## Visitors at CODE

by Conxa Iglesias, CODE

### February-March 2005

#### **Jorge OVIEDO**

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*Research interests*

Game Theory

## Visitors at FEEM

by Silvia Bertolin, FEEM

### May 2005



#### **Zili YANG**

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
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*Research interests*

Economic and Environmental Modelling,  
Climate Change, Climate Negotiations.



## About CTN

The Coalition Theory Network (CTN – [www.feem.it/ctn](http://www.feem.it/ctn)) is an association of six high level scientific institutions, aimed at the advancement and the diffusion of research in the area of coalition formation. The six current members are: the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (CODE), the Center for Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE), the Équipe Universitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (EUREQua), the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), the Université de Marseille (GREQAM), and the Department of Economics at University of Warwick.

## Members

### ▣ CODE

<http://pareto.uab.es/code/>

Local coordinator:

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### ▣ CORE

<http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/>

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### ▣ FEEM

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### ▣ GREQAM

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Local coordinator:

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### ▣ University of Warwick – Department of Economics

<http://www.warwick.ac.uk/economics/>

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