



Issue No. 5-2006

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Editorial

by Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University and University of Warwick

The 11th Annual Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network marked the first time that this event was held in the UK. The Department of Economics of the University of Warwick and UNINET, an EU funded network on unifying network theory, along with the Department of Mathematic, hosted the event. As has become the norm, there were many submissions. A complete copy of the final programme is on the CTN website at <http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/22pev.html>.

The 11th Annual Meeting also marked the entrance of two new members of the CTN, Maastricht University and Vanderbilt University. Both of the new members have a group of researchers working directly on problems of coalition theory, including research on cooperative and noncooperative group (or coalition) formation. Also, both members have expertise in related areas such as game theory and social choice. In addition, they bring to the CTN researchers in applied areas, such as law and economics, inequality, and industrial organization. The admission of Maastricht and Vanderbilt into the CTN is consistent with Sergio Currarini's view, expressed in the last issue, that the CTN is becoming broader both in terms of the scope of its scientific activities and in its outreach to the profession.

This Newsletter also marks my first contribution of an editorial to the CTN and I'd like to take this opportunity to express some opinions - the purpose of an editorial, after all.

For me, the CTN is a club - not a "coalition" as the term is frequently used (and not according to the dictionary definition of a coalition). The CTN is certainly not, however, a club in the sense of the term in the now vast literature on core-equilibrium equivalence. Instead, the CTN is a club consisting of a loosely defined group of people from several research institutions organized for a common purpose - to foster

research on both the theory of coalitions and the impacts of coalitional activities on socio-economic outcomes. The success and growth of the club depends both on the scientific interests of its members and on the voluntary contributions of the individual researchers not of money but of time, interest, opinions, and valuable feedback to the research of others. Research is at times a solitary activity but without a forum for that research it cannot flourish. Through its annual workshop and its other activities, such as the CTN working paper series and its connection with the Grand Coalition, the CTN provides a forum and a community centre for a group of scholars. With their contributions, the early members of the CTN - the Center for Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE), the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (CODE), and the Université de Marseille (GREQAM) - along with the newer members - the Department of Economics at University of Warwick and the Équipe Universitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (EUREQua) - have created a successful and growing club that we at Vanderbilt are delighted to join. That the fine group of researchers at Maastricht is also joining is an added bonus. We look forward to hosting the 2011 Annual Meeting of the CTN here at Vanderbilt.

Myrna Wooders

11th Coalition Theory Network Meeting - Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Structure of Social Relationships

A short report on the event

by Alessandra Sgobbi, FEEM

The 11th CTN Meeting was held at the University of Warwick, UK, from the 19th to the 21st of January 2006. The workshop was organised with the support of the Department of Economics of the University of Warwick, UNINET, the British Academy, and the Association for Public Economic Theory.

This year's workshop had a special focus on dynamic coalition formation and structure of social relationships, including inequality and its consequences. Contributions focused both on the theory of network and social relations, and on empirical applications and analyses.

After a brief overview of the mathematical aspects of network theory by M. Kirkilionis, covering topics such as graph theory and network topology, attaching state spaces to network graphs, and continuous dynamic systems of networks, the paper by Galeotti, Goyal and Jackson explored the questions of how location in the network affects individual behaviour, and how the structure of the network as a whole influences individual behaviour. A general theoretical model is built to analyse strategic interactions when the structure of the neighbourhood affects individuals' payoffs, and there is incomplete information on the underlying structure of the network. The main findings of the model are that, with incomplete information, there are clear-cut monotonicity properties of the result - more specifically, every equilibrium with symmetric players is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in games with strategic complements (substitutes) if there exist externalities. On the other hand, monotone equilibria can exist with more rich information structures, but not all equilibria are monotone.

Network stability is the topic of the next two papers. Hering, Mauleon and Vannetelbosh introduce pairwise farsighted stable networks as a new concept to predict which networks may form among farsighted players. A network is said to be pairwise farsighted stable if (i) all the possible "pairwise" deviations are deterred by the threat of ending with worse (or equal) payoffs; and (ii) if, when adding or deleting links in the network, farsighted players come back to the original network when they are allowed to successively add or delete links. Page and Wooders look at what networks are likely to emerge and persist by introducing the concept of path dominance relation. Under the path dominance relation, a network G path dominates another network G' if there is a finite sequence of networks, beginning with G and ending with G' , where each network along the sequence dominates its predecessor.

Finally, the paper by Chillemi, Gui and Rocco presents a theoretical framework to investigate the effects of the presence of cooperative agents in a heterogeneous community, when there is asymmetric information on agents' type and group stability is endogenous. A model of network formation where connected agents contribute to aggregate payoffs and the Myerson value is applied to determine the share of the resources to agents is on the other hand discussed by P. Ping. Using a refinement of pairwise stability, the author is able

to demonstrate that, for any N , when the equilibrium is a tree (acyclical connected graph) and there is no decay, the diameter of the network never exceeds 8.

Various authors explore the emergence of norms and institutional designs. The problem faced by Konrad and Leininger is one of allocating payoffs among clan members. The proposed framework is fully non-cooperative, but it is found that a group of players can successfully coordinate on efficient actions and on an equitable division of the total revenue. The main results are that a fully efficient first-best outcome of the collective good problem can be implemented, in which all members of the group receive some -- possibly the same -- share in the group's income. What matters for the sharing of the benefit is the difference between the two strongest players of the group: a clan can benefit from cooperation if this difference is not too large and the distribution of the benefits is merit-based. In the paper by Faias and Wooders, a strategic Nash two stage model of club formation is presented, in which players' crowding characteristics emerge endogenously in the model. That is, they are a by-product of their private consumption, and of the private consumption of others. In the first stage of the game, players acquire their crowding type through their choice of private consumption, which depends on the unobservable genetic type of the player. In the second stage, with the crowding profile for the whole economy already determined, players choose which club to join. In this second stage of the game, players are assumed to choose lotteries (probability distribution) over jurisdictions. The authors find that, under the given assumptions, an SPE in mixed strategies exist, even though the equilibrium is not fully characterised. Finally, Sánchez-Pagés and Straub also explore the endogenous emergence of institutions as mechanisms to coordinate actors, where agents have the possibility to institute (costly) institutions, which need to be self-enforcing.

The issue of identifying the underlying community structures from network data was the subject of a paper by Copic, Jackson and Kirman, who propose a new methodology to overcome the shortcomings of existing methods, which are defined by algorithms and do not have a real model about what a community is. This paper adopts a reverse perspective: starting with a model of what a community structure is and how it generates networks, the most likely community structure is inferred, using a maximum likelihood estimations. This well-established statistical approach not only identifies the most likely community structure, but also provides a complete ranking of alternative community structures. The approach, however, precludes layers of community. The authors also provide axioms that uniquely identify ML as a method for identifying community structures.

Several papers explore the impacts of externalities on network formation and coalition stability. Amann and Gall look at the formation of social groups, where externalities exist in the form of human capital accumulation. The authors propose a one-side matching model with endogenous group size and strictly non-transferable utility, building on stylised facts observed in the context of capital acquisition in education. The hypothesis is that, if capital accumulation is the only form of utility for members of a group, homogenous groups would form in terms of members' grades. On the other hand, if other forms of utility are present, emerging groups may be heterogeneous. To explore this hypothesis, an additional source of utility is included in the model: the existence of positive peer effects in study groups is well documented, but members may also gain from "consumptive" peer effects that increase their utility instantaneously. These may be thought of as favours provided by group members to their mates. Gains from trading across productive and consumptive peer effects are introduced by assuming agents are heterogeneous along the two dimensions. The model predicts segregation at the top and at the bottom of the attribute space, and a bunching in different regions of the type space for intermediate values. The possibility for agents to compensate across dimensions drives this result.

Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo, and Wettstein deal, on the other hand, with the emergence of cooperative behaviour in the presence of externalities, where the surplus generated by a group of agents depends upon the organisation of agents outside the group. The authors propose mechanisms to implement the Shapely value in the presence of positive and negative externalities, which are extensions of the multi-bidding procedure proposed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) and (2002), for environments with no externalities. The mechanisms are parameterised by the weighted averages (nonnegative weights) of the externalities. The family of values satisfies the properties of efficiency, anonymity, linearity and the null player property. The main result is that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals: these mechanisms thus provide a non-cooperative foundation to the family of values suggested in Macho-Stadler et al. (2004), and may be used in the presence of externalities, thus overcoming the problem of strategic behaviour.

Applying network theory, Berghammer, Rusinowska and de Swart use the concept of network stability and propose the use of graph theory to identify stable (i.e. undominated) government coalitions. Their paper proposes a procedure to select a government in the absence of an undominated government - in graph-theoretic terms, when the dominance graph has no source. The approach is based on a combination of graph theory and social choice method, and it is applied to analyse government formation in Poland after the 2001 elections. The method suggests the removal of government which are least attractive for two reasons: because they are most frequently dominated, and because they dominate other governments less frequently. If this refinement procedure does not lead to the identification of a unique government, the final stable government is selected by applying bargaining theory or some social choice rules.

Another interesting application of network theory is presented in the paper by A. Galeotti, which combines a model of consumer search with a social network to explore the general research question of how social interactions and markets jointly shape economic outcome. In this model, two identical firms compete in prices. Consumers, who are linked in a social network, can acquire information on product prices in two ways: (i) through (costly) searches or (ii) through social relations and (free) information sharing. The author finds that social connections create free riding incentives among consumers, thus making the equilibrium outcome be closer to the monopolistic outcome. Comparing across networks, it is shown that there are perverse incentives in more connected networks, and the expected equilibrium price is higher. Intuitively, connections increase consumers' incentives to free ride on information collection. It is suggested that this may contribute to explaining why the emergence of internet shopping did not bring about the expected price reduction: search is less costly but, as information is a public good, competition may have been reduced rather than increased. Finally, Deroian presents an application of network theory to the study of firms' incentives to take part in R&D alliances, where the knowledge generated by such an alliance propagates through the network of existing alliances.

The rest of the papers discuss a variety of topics, ranging from aversion to inequality to the empirical investigation of neighbours' influence on individual choices.

The issue of inequality is explored by Maria Montero. Starting from the observation that both empirical evidence and experimental results indicate that two parties share a surplus more equitably than the theory would predict, a sequential offer bargaining game in which unanimity is not required is used to examine the implications of inequity aversion. Contrary to expectations, it is found that aversion to inequality may lead to a more inequitable outcome than would occur with selfish preferences, when players' utilities are specified using the utility function proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). This is due to the analogy between inequity and risk aversion: even though responders dislike getting less than the proposer, they are willing to accept smaller shares in order to avoid the risk of being excluded altogether. Furthermore, the effect of impatience may be reversed, and work against the proposer. This is because the equilibrium outcome may be so inequitable that responders would actually prefer that all players get 0 and, by rejecting the proposal, they can temporarily enforce this outcome. As players become more impatient, rejecting the proposal becomes more attractive and the proposer must compensate the responders if he wants the proposal to be accepted.

Beal and Qu  rou look at the (non-cooperative) formation of networks with bounded rational players, who have the possibility of forming links among each other providing access to pair-wise interactions. The authors consider a repeated game of network formation with finite time horizon, where agents who are initially unconnected can form or remove links with each other. Unanimity is needed to form a link, whereas removal may be unilateral. Agents are boundedly rational, that is, their strategies are restricted in the sense that they have limited ability to anticipate opponents' behaviour. The main conclusion of the paper is that there is considerable difference between networks emerging with rational or boundedly rational agents -- by restricting the set of strategies available to players, some form of coordination is more likely to emerge.

The effect of commitment strategies on bilateral bargaining in a non-cooperative setting is explored in the paper by Bade, Haeringer and Renou. More specifically, parties cannot sign binding agreements, but have the power to restrict their own action sets. In the first stage of the game, players decide on their commitment strategies. In the second stage, bilateral bargaining takes place. In this setting, self-enforceability of a commitment strategy is obtained through a simple sequential game structure. The set of action profiles that can be implemented through commitment are fully characterised. These implementable profiles are found to be generally inefficient, but the authors show that the ability to restrict own set of strategies can nonetheless improve upon the status quo.

In the paper by Maurin and Moschion, the influence of neighbourhood characteristics on labour choices by mothers is explored using econometric estimation techniques. The distribution of the sex of siblings of other mothers living in the neighbourhood is used as an instrumental variable to identify the influence of other mothers on the decisions to participate in the labour market. According to the models' estimations, a 10 percent points increase in the participation rate of neighbours increases a woman's probability of participation by about 8 percent points. The empirical results thus support a significant influence of neighbourhood on individual decisions.

The final paper by Tangian presents a model to assess the five leading German political parties and their coalitions in terms of their popularity (the percentage of the electorate represented) and universality (the frequency of representing a majority), derived from party manifestos and the results of 2005 parliamentary elections.



A new CTN member: the Economics Department at Maastricht University

by Bettina Klaus, University of Maastricht

The Maastricht CTN research group consists of members of the Economics Department and the Department of Quantitative Economics. The current active researchers are Jean-Jacques Herings, Bettina Klaus, László Á. Kóczy, Andrés Perea, Hans Peters, Arno Riedl, and Ingrid Rohde.

Jean-Jacques Herings's research in coalition theory and related topics can be divided into two areas. First, the study of graph games, in particular the study of conditions under which the core of such games is non-empty and the study of solution concepts like the Myerson value and the average tree solution. Second, the study of farsightedness in network formation. Here the emphasis is on developing new solution concepts, study existence, and perform comparative statics exercises.

Bettina Klaus is currently working on (two-sided matching) markets. Her focus has been on fairness and the analysis of stability in matching markets. Extensions of the standard models so far include matching markets with couples and the recent model of matching with contracts. In a next step, she plans to extend her work to coalition and network formation problems.

László Kóczy studies the core in a dynamic context and/or in games with externalities. He has defined the minimal dominant set, a non-empty solution concept, and shown it to coincide with a non-empty core. Kóczy's latest works investigate a priori voting indices in a strategic context.

For the last few years, *Andrés Perea* has been working with Noemí Navarro (CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve) on the problem of fair allocation in networks. Currently, they investigate the problem of fair allocation in two-sided matching structures, where the matching structure may change over time. They treat both the dynamics and the allocation rule as endogenous variables. More precisely, they require that (1) two players who are currently matched should lose (or gain) the same expected amount in the future by dissolving their link today, and (2) the probability of dissolving an existing link or creating a new link should be proportional to the expected gain of dissolving or creating this link. Some questions to be answered are: Which types of dynamics and allocation rules satisfy both of these requirements, and is it always possible to satisfy both conditions?

Hans Peters works on games with restricted coalitions. Examples of this line of research are two joint papers with Jean Derks: "A Shapley Value for Games with Restricted Coalitions," *International Journal of Game Theory* (1993), 21, 351-360 and "Consistent Restricted Shapley Values," *Mathematical Social Sciences* (1997), 33, 75-91.

Arno Riedl is interested in theoretical and experimental research of network formation and the analysis of social behavior on self-organizing networks. His interest also comprises the investigation of coalition formation when taking psychological regularities into account.

Ingrid Rohde 's PhD project has the aim to improve the understanding of how social networks form and how they influence economic and social behavior. She will investigate the mutual influence of individual behavior and network formation and the consequences that arise from intervention of authorities.

Apart from an interest in coalition and network theory, the researchers of the Maastricht CTN branch are very active in closely related research fields such as game theory, behavioral economics, general equilibrium theory, mathematical economics, operations research, and social choice theory. A list of local events and information about all local researchers will be provided on the Maastricht CTN webpage at <http://www.personeel.unimaas.nl/b.klaus/CTN.html>.

According to the international research rankings on <http://www.econphd.net/>, Maastricht University is currently ranked number 37 worldwide (number 7 in Europe) in the microeconomic theory category and number 15 worldwide (number 4 in Europe) in the sub-disciplines general equilibrium theory, cooperative game theory, and mathematical & computational economics.



Complex network analysis and economics

by Markus Kirkilionis, University of Warwick

There has recently much effort to understand complex networks in different areas of applications, predominantly in biology, physics, computer science, sociology and economics. The reason may well be that, like in games popular since centuries like Chess and Go, the concepts and rules are relatively easy to grasp, but the complexity of possible states and their evolution in time is beyond simple reasoning.

Perhaps it is not too far fetched to say that we are currently living in a world of complex networks, at least intellectually. The scientific focus tends to turn away from what we could call 'mean-field models', i.e. models that describe complex systems with all system components being equal and every component being connected to every other such component. All classical market models are of this type. The trend is now to identify the local connections that actors and players in the different games structuring an economy (or another such system under scientific observation) are creating. Interestingly what we could call 'globalisation' as a major trend in global economy seems to be (obviously?) described theoretically as having more connections between economic nodes. Does this mean we can go back to the classical market models where due to increased flow of information and capital transactions are completely visible and reachable to the economy as a whole? A warning seems to be in place: Local connections in an interaction network can still be very uneven distributed, and depending on the definition of an economic node local hubs with many more connections than its neighbours are likely to be created. Very often the 'winner takes all' phenomenon is in place, meaning that a node with many links in an evolving network is likely to attract even more links from other nodes, making the link distribution close to a power law. In economic terms such a network is not evolving by poor chance, but active choice and adoption of strategies create preferential links, where the probability of forming a new link is dependent on the so called degree of the node (i.e. the number of links this node already possesses).

Using this more than brief discussion of globalisation as a basis it is tempting to think that graph theory (the mathematical theory describing network structures) linked with probability theory would be the major source of mathematical description of economic and social behaviour. Indeed such models are currently dominating complex systems theory for good reasons. Nevertheless it is obvious that many economic and social structures will not be easily mapped to such a framework. In the order of complexity from a theoretical point-of-view we could make the following list of modelling techniques:

- Static network topologies.
- Evolving network topologies.
- Static networks with weights attached to either nodes or links.
- Evolving networks with weights attached to either nodes or links.
- Static networks with temporal changes of weights (i.e. dynamical systems defined on either nodes or links).
- Evolving networks with temporal changes of weights.

Some explanation seems to be in place. In the discussion above the restriction was to the first two types of modelling approaches. We introduced links between economic players, also possibly changing the links over time. But there was no discussion of the strength of the link. For example such a model would become more realistic if the actual average flow of information between economic or social players would be taken into account. The 'travelling salesman' is of the same type. Here the distance between cities forms a weight on the links of the network without which the problem cannot be properly posed.

Inspired by these examples it is now obvious that the weights defined on the graph are mathematically speaking so-called state spaces. The weights are needed to describe the economic or social situation at a given time. The own state of a node (for example the currently available resources) or of a link (for example the strength of resource or information flow) is needed to properly map reality into a theoretical framework.

But now it is obvious that the state on the nodes and links may also vary temporarily. Here we definitely leave the classical area of graph theory and enter a relatively new field, i.e. dynamical systems defined on graphs. There are only a few examples of such models in the literature, most likely due to the difficulties in their investigation. Again we can look at the situation with a fixed number of nodes (players, individuals, economic units) and links, or with a temporarily changing number of nodes and/or links between them. Also both the time and the state space can have either a discrete or a continuous structure. Moreover the dynamics, i.e. the rules with which the state spaces change their state can be either of a deterministic or probabilistic nature.

An example should shed some light on these concepts. Classical time-continuous game theory with n players, for example with the strategy set defined by the 'replicator dynamics' (Eigen, Schuster, Sigmund, Hofbauer) would constitute a network with n nodes and a time-continuous deterministic dynamical system defined on each of the nodes. The interaction strength between the nodes would be static and given according to a matrix defined at the start of the game.

This was an example of a static network with temporal changes of weights on the nodes. In more general terms economic and social interaction will nearly always depend on some internal state of the players or agents that can vary in time. Here one of the main tasks of the future is to identify a minimal set of variables for different situations that can adequately reflect such internal dispositions necessary to describe the game. Here mathematics, physics, economy, psychology and social sciences will have to work hand in hand. The same holds for the description of the interactions. In most situations the flow of resources and information between players and agents will in turn depend on their own internal states, and vice versa. Again the proper choice of state spaces is the first important and highly non-trivial step. Often the result may well be a multitude of different overlying networks between the nodes describing the different ways in which they interact. Here as always in theoretical approaches there is surely a pay-off between more realistic model representation and mathematical tractability. Most often it is not fruitful to consider too complicated models for which no mathematical results can be obtained. From a philosophy of science point-of-view such models do not exclude any of the possibilities that may constitute the reality around us. In other words they do not enhance our understanding.



New papers on coalition theory

FEEM Working Papers

96.05

[Optimal Control and Spatial Heterogeneity: Pattern Formation in Economic-Ecological Models](#)

William Brock and Anastasios Xepapadeas

98.05

[Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement](#)

Rob Dellink, Michael Finus, Niels Olieman

99.05

[Bargaining Coalitions in the Agricultural Negotiations of the Doha Round: Similarity of Interests or Strategic](#)

Choices? An Empirical Assessment*Fabrizio De Filippis, Valeria Costantini, Riccardo Crescenzi, Luca Salvatici*

107.2005

Coordination in Networks Formation: Experimental Evidence on Learning and Salience*Michele Bernasconi and Matteo Galizzi*

120.2005

A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues*Federico Echenique and Mehmet B. Yenmwz*

9.2006

United We Vote*Jon X. Eguia*

10.2006

A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games*Shao Chin Sung and Dinko Dimitrov*

19.2006

A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems*Somdeb Lahiri*

31.2006

Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret*Andrea Gallice*

34.2006

Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion*Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens***CODE Papers and Working Papers**

UAB-CSIC WP 652.05

The Making of International Environmental Agreements*Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer*

UAB-CSIC WP 653.05

Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples*Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn*

Barcelona Economics-CREA WP 78

Some Things Couples Always Wanted to Know about Stable Matchings (but were afraid to ask). (Revised)*Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn & Jordi Massó*

Barcelona Economics-CREA WP 156

Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples [Published: *Games and Economic Behavior* (forthcoming)]*Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn*

Barcelona Economics-CREA WP 165

Median Stable Matching for College Admission. (Revised)*Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn*

Barcelona Economics-CREA WP 248

A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games*Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber*

Barcelona Economics-CREA WP 263

Employment by Lotto Revisited

Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn

Barcelona Economics-CREA WP 264

On the Rule of k Names (revised)

Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho

Barcelona Economics-CREA WP 274

Winners and Losers from the Gradual Formation of Trading Blocs

Inés Macho-Stadler & Licun Xue

Barcelona Economics-CREA WP

Bilateral Commitment (forthcoming)

Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou

CORE Papers and Working Papers

CORE DP 2005-40

International R&D collaboration networks

Huasheng Song and Vincent Vannetelbosch

CORE DP 2005-41

Networks of manufacturers and retailers

Ana Mauleon, Jose Sempere-Monerris and Vincent Vannetelbosch

CORE DP 2005-44

Peripheral diversity and redistribution

Klaus Desmet, Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin and Shlomo Weber

CORE DP 2005-46

Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare

Jean Hindriks and Ben Lockwood

CORE DP 2005-56

Balance of power and divergence of policies in a model of electoral competition

Anna Rubinchik-Pessach and Shlomo Weber.

CORE DP 2005-95

A note on expanding networks and monopoly pricing

Jean j. Gabszewicz and Filomena Garcia

CORE DP 2005-96

Quality improvement and network externalities

Jean J. Gabszewicz and Filomena Garcia

CORE DP 2006-2

Asymmetric information, word-of-mouth and social networks: from the market for lemons to efficiency

Noemi Navarro

CORE DP 2006-3

Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion

Parkash Chander and Henry Tulkens

CORE DP 2006-7

Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core

Anna Bogomolnaia, Michel Le Breton, Alexei Savvateev and Shlomo Weber

EUREQua Working Papers

2006.05

"The Worst-Case Scenario and Discounting the Very Long Term"*Hadji Fall*

2005.61

"Cournot Competition in Spatial Markets : some complementary results on complementarity"*Andreea Cosnita*

2005.59

"Endogenous persistent inequality"*Falilou Fall***University of Warwick Working Papers**

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Status Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies*A. Van den Nouweland and Myrna Wooders*

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Correlated equilibrium and behavioral conformity*Edward Cartwright and Myrna Wooders*

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Sovereign Risk: Constitutions Rule*Emanuel Kohlscheen*

727

A Note on the Hybrid Equilibrium in the Besley-Smart Model*Ben Lockwood***GREQAM Working Papers**

2005-10

Labour pooling, labour poaching, and spatial clustering*P.P. Combes G. Duranton*

2005-17

Open software: knowledge openness and cooperation in cyberspace*D. Foray S. Thoron J-B. Zimmermann*

2005-18

Négociations multilatérales entre entreprises hétérogènes : la loi du plus fort ou l'union fait la force?*S. Thoron*

2005-21

Bilateral collaboration and emergent networks*R. Cowan, N. Jonard, J-B. Zimmermann*

2005-23

Horizontal merger in bilaterally duopolistic industries with differentiated products*Z. M'Chirgui, W. Hichri*

2005-24

Communication networks with endogenous link strength*F. Bloch, B. Dutta*

2005-32

Informal Insurance in Social Networks*F. Bloch, D. Ray*

2005-33

Definitions of Equilibrium in Network Formation Games*F. Bloch, M.O. Jackson*

2005-39

New approaches to intellectual property : from open software to knowledge-based industrial activities*N. Jullien , J.B. Zimmermann*

2005-43

Inter-firm agreements in the smart card industry since the mid-1990s : Network dynamics and field evolution*Z. M'Chirgui*

2005-44

A model for the use of the electronic purse*Z. M'Chirgui*

2005-48

Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games*F. Bloch , E. Diamantoudi***Maastricht University Working Papers**

METEOR RM/05/056

The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle- Free Graph Games*Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Laan, Gerard, van der & Talman,Dolf*

METEOR RM/05/042

The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks*Kóczy,László Á.*

METEOR RM/05/032

In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents*Goeree,Jacob K. & Riedl,Arno & Ule,Aljaz*

METEOR RM/05/028

Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts*Haake,Claus-Jochen & Klaus,Bettina***Vanderbilt University Working Papers**

05-W26

Correlated Equilibrium and Behavioral Conformity*Edward Cartwright and Myrna Wooders*

05-W27

The Law of Demand in Tiebout Economies*Edward Cartwright and Myrna Wooders*

05-W29

Club Formation Games with Farsighted Agents*Frank H. Page, Jr. and Myrna H. Wooders*

06-W01

Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation*Ben Zissimos and Myrna Wooders*

06-W02

Tax Competition Reconsidered*Amrita Dhillon, Myrna Wooders, and Ben Zissimos*

06-W03

Social Choice: New Developments*Walter Bossert and John A. Weymark*

Recent and forthcoming events

NEXT CTN EVENT

Coalition Theory Network Session for PET 06

→<http://pet06.univ-paris1.fr/>

In cooperation with the National University of Economics of Vietnam, the Association for Public Economic Theory (APET) is organizing PET 06 Hanoi, to be held July 30 - August 3, 2006. The Coalition Theory Network will organise one session within the PET 06. CTN encourages the development and the circulation of new research on coalition theory and group formation. Straightforward application of such theories is important in both economical and political areas, such as the study of international negotiations, the analysis of coalition formation in parliaments and the cabinet formation, the cartel stability in various industries and finally, group formation in various sociological environments. Submission of papers on these topics is open until **April, 15th**. Papers can be sent to: silvia.bertolin@feem.it

2006 NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference

Paris, France, 6-8 April, 2006→<http://www.decentralization06.com/>

The Decentralization Conference is organised by Frank H. Page, Jr. (C&BA, University of Alabama), Jean-Marc Bonnisseau (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, University Paris-1), Hubert Kempf (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, University Paris-1), and sponsored by: NSF, NBER, C&BA/EFLS University of Alabama, Université Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, CNRS.

XXVI International Sunbelt Social Network Conference

Vancouver , British Columbia , Canada , 25-30 April, 2006→http://www.insna.org/INSNA/conf_inf.html

The International Sunbelt Social Network Conference is a major forum for social scientists, mathematicians, computer scientists, ethnologists, and others to present current work in the area of social networks. It provides an opportunity for individuals interested in theory, methods, or applications of social networks to share ideas and common concerns.

Advances in Collective Choice

Maastricht University , The Netherlands, April 29th 2006→www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/algec/research/index.htm

At <http://www.personeel.unimaas.nl/b.klaus/InvitationCC.pdf> please find an invitation and a tentative program to the workshop "Advances in Collective Choice," which will take place on April 29th in Maastricht , The Netherlands.

If you are interested to attend the workshop please register with Kelly Moonen (k.moonen@algec.unimaas.nl) before **March 30th**. We will put further information on a workshop webpage (see <http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/algec/research/index.htm>) soon.

13th IFAC Workshop on Control Applications of Optimisation (CAO'06)

Paris - Cachan , France , 26 - 28 April 2006

→http://www.uam.es/personal_pdi/ciencias/ezuazua/IFAC.htm

The workshop will cover all topics related to optimisation in the frame of control system theory, including (but not limited to) the following: Optimisation methods, Optimal control, Differential games, Stochastic optimisation, Numerical methods for optimisation, Optimisation with uncertainties, Multi-objective control and optimisation, Robust control and stabilisation, Applications in economics and management, Optimal PDE Control.

The workshop will provide a forum for the presentation of new developments in the interacting fields of optimisation and control. It is dedicated to promote recent research results in the field of numerical optimization methods and their applications in control as well as new advances in optimal control, differential games, robust control and optimisation, etc. One of the aims of the workshop is to bring together researchers and engineers and to give an up to date view of the major applications of optimisation for control purposes and for decision making in economy and industry. Theoretical and practical aspects will be discussed

ESNIE 2006 - 5th session of the European School on New Institutional Economics

Cargèse (Corsica), France, 15 - 20 May 2006

→<http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/en/2006/index.php>

ESNIE 2006 will combine formal lectures and workshops. Each morning is devoted to a special theme addressed by two complementary lectures. Lectures include not only the state of the art of the discipline, but also the main research questions, the policy implications and an assessment of the future directions of research. Workshops, which aim is to present the "state of the art" either on a "research question" or on a "technical topic" in order to make participants aware of the recent developments in the field, and to enable them to imagine how they could take into account and contribute to the "frontier" of research in their own work. Two workshops are held in parallel every afternoon.

International Workshop on: Spatial econometrics and statistics

Rome , Italy , 26-27 May 2006

→<http://www.unich.it/conferencerome2006/>

Spatial econometrics is a field that has registered a dramatic increase of the interest within the scientific community both in terms of the variety of the methods employed and in terms of theoretical economic models that make use of such methods. After the fruitful experience of the previous European conferences held in Toulouse (2002), Dijon (2003), Strasbourg (2004), Toulouse (2005) and Kiel (2005), the Rome workshop aims at bringing together economists, statisticians and econometricians sharing an interest in spatial economic problems in order to promote a cooperation and to discuss the future perspectives of the discipline.

The workshop hosts contribution related to methodological, economic-theoretical or empirical advances to spatial econometrics.

V Seminary of doctoral students in economic and social integration

Bordeaux , France , 8 - 9 June 2006

→<http://yvars.u-bordeaux4.fr/doc2006.pdf>

The Chair Jean Monnet *Compared Regional Integration* of the University Montesquieu - Bordeaux IV organizes its IVth International Seminary Doctoral Students in Economic and Social Integration on **June 8 (Thursday) and June 9 (Friday), 2006**. It is intended to the doctoral students working on the analysis of the Economic and Social Integration (questions of health included). The Seminary will comprise three times. The first (one half - day) will be devoted to interventions of confirmed seekers on recent evolution of the Economy of Integration. The second time (two half - days) will concern the statement, by young seekers, a part of their doctoral work. The third time will be used by others young seekers to the presentation of articles destined for a review with committee (demand of the French CNU). Each intervention will make the object of a report and a discussion.

EU-Countries in Fiscal Competition

Mannheim , Germany , 13-16 June 2006

→<http://www.zew.de/de/veranstaltungen/details.php?LFDNR=490>

The Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) is pleased to announce its 8th Summer Workshop for Young Economists. The general topic of this workshop is "EU Countries in Fiscal Competition". The workshop is meant to provide a forum for discussions between young talented researchers and distinguished experts in their field of research. The programme consists of lectures by experienced researchers and presentations of young scholars on the first three days. Extensive time will be provided for discussions among participants.

Dynamics, Economic Growth and International Trade**Jerusalem , Israel , 18-19 June 2006**

→<http://www.socialcapitalgateway.org/ita-jerusalem.htm>

This conference is a sequel to ten previous conferences with the same theme held in Denmark (1996), Hong Kong (1997), Taiwan (1998), Tilburg (1999), Rome (2000), Vienna (2001), Cologne (2002), Helsinki (2003), Reykjavik (2004), and Mexico City (2005). The conference will focus on "Globalization and Growth in a Long Term Perspective" and it will include sessions on: Unified Growth Theory, The Transition from Stagnation to Growth, Inequality and Growth, The Great Divergence, Technology and Growth, Trade and Growth, Stages of Development

12th Conference on the Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory (FUR XII)**Rome , Italy , 22-26 June 2006**

→<http://www.luiss.it/fur2006/homepage.php>

FUR is an acronym for The Foundations and Applications of Risk, Utility and Decision Theory. The first FUR conference was held in Oslo in 1982 and was founded by Maurice Allais and Ole Hagen. Since then they have been held in Venice (1984), Aix-en-Provence (1986), Budapest (1988), Duke (1990), Paris (1992), Oslo (1994), Mons (1997), Marrakech (1999), Torino (2001), Paris-Cachan (2004). FUR is truly interdisciplinary, reflected by the fact that its Scientific Committee includes experts in the Decision Sciences from Economics, Management Science, Psychology, Finance, Mathematics, Philosophy, Computer Science and Statistics.

INFORMS 2006**Hong Kong , 25-28 June 2006**

→<http://www.informs.org/Conf/Hongkong06/index.htm>

The theme of the INFORMS International Hong Kong 2006 meeting comprises a broad area of application in which our discipline's strengths in modeling, analysis and algorithm design can be utilized to make vital contributions. As a natural outgrowth of this theme, the conference program will also emphasize the importance of the relationship between basic research and the practice of OR/MS. We invite you to share your OR/MS applications and to develop a better understanding of what the OR/MS profession has contributed and has to offer in various areas of application.

Maastricht Summer School in Governance & Social Protection**Maastricht , Netherlands , from 26 June to 1 July 2006**

→<http://www.governance.unimaas.nl/>

The Maastricht Graduate School of Governance invites you to participate in its international, research related and policy oriented summer school in Governance and Social Protection. The Summer School is organized every other year and is part of the PhD programme in Social Protection Policy. This six days summer school is organised from 26 June to 1 July 2006. All courses and the course-materials are offered in English. The summer school is organised by Maastricht University , in cooperation with the partner universities and the institutes of Isprit network and the US-based network of the Multidisciplinary and

Comparative Program in Inequality and Social Policy of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

**6th Villa Mondragone Workshop in Economic Theory and Econometrics
Monte Porzio Catone, Rome , Italy , from 29 June to 2 July 2006**

→http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/sefemeq/professori/peracchi/Workshop/sixth_edition/index.htm

The workshop is organized jointly by the CEIS, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", and AIDEI (Associazione Internazionale degli Economisti Italiani) with the financial support from the Fondazione IRI. It is designed to stimulate the interaction between senior economists and young researchers - Post-Doctoral students and Doctoral students well ahead in their dissertation - working on a variety of economic issues, both theoretical and empirical. A special session on corporate governance and corporate finance is sponsored by the Fondazione IRI. The specific purpose of the workshop is to offer young researchers advise and constructive criticism from more senior scholars. The workshop is residential, and both young and senior researchers are expected to participate to all sessions. The working language is English.

**21st European Conference on Operational Research
Iceland , 2-5 July 2006**

→<http://www.euro2006.org/>

Within the conference theme "OR for Better Management of Sustainable Development" we aim to showcase how OR can improve the management of this important topic that touches everyone in the world. For decades, Icelanders have produced electricity by hydropower and heated their buildings by geothermal power. The Reykjavík public transportation authority is taking part in a pioneer project running some city buses on hydrogen fuel cells, using the world-first commercial hydrogen filling station. Icelandic nature is characterized by variety. In just a few hours, you can drive through lava fields, mountains and meadows, past geysers and hot springs - even across glaciers. The countryside is dotted by numerous lakes, while streams cascade down the mountainsides in countless waterfalls. The greatest challenge facing a visitor to Iceland may indeed be deciding on which adventure to enjoy. Located on the volcanic Atlantic rift, midway between Europe and America , Iceland is a suitable location for a European meeting with international flavour. The Organising and Programme Committees are working hard to secure the quality of the academic program as well as that of other aspects of the conference.

**12th International Symposium On Dynamic Games And Applications
Sophia Antipolis, France, 3-6 July 2006**

→<http://www-sop.inria.fr/coprin/Congress/ISDG06/>

The International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications is a biennial professional event. The first one was held in 1984 in Haifa, Israel . It was followed by meetings in Williamsburg, USA (1986), Antibes, France (1988), Espoo, Finland (1990), Grimentz, Switzerland (1992), St. Jovite, Canada (1994), Kanagawa, Japan (1996), Maastricht, The Netherlands (1998), Adelaide, South Australia (2000), and St. Petersburg Russia (2002), Tucson Arizona, USA (2004). The three day technical program will consist of plenary sessions, invited sessions, and presentations of contributed papers. The topics include: Dynamic games and applications, Repeated games, Stochastic games, Learning and adaptive games, Evolutionary games, Cooperative equilibria, H-infinity control and robust controller designs, Theory of optimal control and dynamic games , Numerical methods and computer implementation of game models, Dynamic bargaining, Pursuit-Evasion games, Search, encounter and inspection games.

**The Third World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists
Kyoto , Japan , 3-7 July 2006**

→<http://www.worldcongress3.org/>

The Third World Congress will be held at the Kyoto International Conference Hall in 2006. The facility where the Congress will be held is most famously the site of the 3rd Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP3) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that produced the Kyoto Protocol. The

Congress is organized by the Japanese Association of Environmental Economists (called the Society of Environmental Economics and Policy Studies: SEEPS), The Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (AERE) and the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE) , in cooperation with the Latin American and Caribbean Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (ALEAR). About 1000 people attended the second World Congress in Monterey in 2002, and we are hoping for similar attendance at Kyoto .

**IAREP/SABE Congress
Paris , France , 5-8 July 2006**

→<http://team.univ-paris1.fr/iarep-sabe2006>

Behavioural economics is a major innovation to the economic way of thinking, which it brings closer to psychology, sociology and the neurosciences. The IAREP-SABE Conference aims at providing a platform to the fast growing number of economists, psychologists, neuroscientists and other social scientists who wish to discuss, rigorously but open-mindedly, their latest research in this emerging field. Relevant topics include all domains in which tenets of economic theory have been seriously and systematically challenged.

**Workshop on Externalities, Public Goods and Games
Stony Brook , NY , United States , 8-9 July 2006**

→<http://www.gtcenter.org/>

From 1990 to 2005, the International Summer Festival on Game Theory at Stony Brook has been a renowned academic gathering of researchers from all over the world. This year we continue that tradition, this time as a part of the Game Theory Society activities.

6th Meeting on Game Theory and Practice Dedicated to Development, Natural Resources and the Environment

Zaragoza , Spain , 10-12 July 2006

→<http://www.iamz.ciheam.org/GTP2006/>

Following the first four biannual meetings on Game Theory Practice in Genoa (Italy, 1998), Valencia (Spain, 2000), Hilvarenbeek (The Netherlands, 2002) and Elche, (Spain, 2004), that were general in nature, and another meeting focusing on Game Practice and the Environment, that was held in Alessandria (Italy, 2002), the sixth meeting on Game Theory Practice (GTP) will focus on development, natural resources and the environment.

The purpose of the meeting is to demonstrate the usefulness of GT in these fields, as externalities among users and conflicts over allocation of basic natural resources such as land, water, and other resources are more frequent. Applications of GT techniques and methods to issues in water resource management (including transboundary water), fisheries, forestry, land management, global warming, pollution, migration (domestic and cross border), and alike, are sought.

Seventh Trento Summer School

Trento, Italy, 3-21 July 2006

→http://www.ceel.economia.unitn.it/summer_school/seventh/index.html

The Seventh Summer School in the Trento Program in Adaptive Economic Dynamics is designed to teach students to use agent-based computational laboratories to conduct ACE experiments and to develop such experiments on their own. Prior programming experience is helpful but not required. Prior Trento Summer Schools have been of two weeks duration. The Seventh Summer School will run for three weeks in order to give students sufficient hands-on experience to be able to teach ACE to their students. The course will be taught by Leigh Tesfatsion, Iowa State University and Robert Axtell, The Brookings Institution. Guest lecturers include Professor John Duffy, University of Pittsburgh , Professor Dan Friedman, University of California , Santa Cruz , Professor Mauro Gallegati, University of Ancona , Professor Herbert Gintis, Central European University and Santa Fe Institute, Peter Howitt, Brown University , and Axel Leijonhufvud of UCLA and the University of Trento.

International Congress of Mathematicians 2006

Madrid , Spain , 22-30 August 2006

→<http://www.icm2006.org/>

On behalf of the Organizing Committee, we are very pleased to invite you to attend the International Congress of Mathematicians to be held in Madrid (Spain) from 22 to 30 August, 2006. Following the long standing tradition of these congresses, ICM2006 will be a major scientific event, bringing together mathematicians from all over the world, and demonstrating the vital role that mathematics play in our society.

Globalization, public policy and multi-jurisdictional governance

Paris , France , 21- 22 September 2006

→<http://www.dauphine.fr/globalisation>

The well-established governmental framework based on a quasi-monopoly of the Nation-State in the determination of public policy has been largely challenged by the contemporary globalization process. In recent decades, public policy has been spread to other forms of jurisdictions both at lower and higher levels of decision. New actors have emerged, faced with challenges raised by economic integration and higher degrees of interdependence. To what extent have these "centrifugal forces" been induced by globalization? What are the new issues raised by this re-organization of public area? How can this broad and sometimes confusing concept of governance be approached in this context? The conference will be organized around three main topics: 1) Globalisation and "vertical" redistribution of public tasks. 2) New issues of public governance in a globalized world. 3) Globalization and new actors of public governance.

8th INFER Annual Conference 2006 "Public Economics"

Cork City , Ireland , 22-24 September 2006

→<http://www.infer-research.net/>

The INFER Annual Conference provides an opportunity for all involved in economic research to exchange their ideas. Researchers are invited to submit theoretical and applied papers across all areas of economics. Papers may be submitted under the theme of this years conference: "Public Economics: economic policy, governance and the role of institutions" or any other area that their research applies to. A number of keynote speakers will be invited to talk on this year's special topic. Researchers are also invited to organise their own session, either under this years theme or a theme of their own choosing, comprising of 2 or more papers. The conference is open to all involved in economic research, including both young and experienced researchers, post-doctoral students, and professionals from business, government and non-governmental institutions. We would especially encourage young researchers and those from the new EU member states to submit a paper.


News, Publications and Job announcements**Doctoral Scholarships in Economics**

The Ruhr Graduate School in Economics (RGS Econ) is a Graduate Program providing a doctoral education in economics with the highest academic standards. Started in 2004, it was initiated and founded by three universities of Germany's Ruhr Area - the University of Bochum, the University of Dortmund and the University of Duisburg-Essen - as well as by RWI Essen, one of Germany's leading economic research institutes. This cooperation pools together a think-tank of top level researchers with a worldwide reputation for their academic achievements. Graduate students at the RGS Econ are thus provided with a unique learning environment, including a well-structured teaching program in small groups with individual coaching, as well as modern infrastructure. The PhD program provides postgraduate education in all relevant fields of modern economics, covering formal theoretical and empirical econometric analyses in labor and population economics, industrial economics, microeconomics, macroeconomics and public economics. Over a period of three years, graduate students receive guidance leading to a PhD in economics, complying with highest international standards.

The deadline for applying is **May 15, 2006**. Details concerning application requirements & procedure: <http://www.rgs-econ.org>

Assistant-doctorate at the Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

Application has to be received by **15 April 2006**. Details concerning application requirements & procedure: <http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/news/Recrutement2006.pdf>

Assistant Professor in Economics

The Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, Indian institute of Technology has recently started 5-year Integrated M. Sc. Programme in Economics in addition to the regular programmes at B. Tech., M. Tech., and Ph. D. levels. The institute is in need of suitable Indian nationals, possessing excellent academic background, commitment to quality teaching and potential for carrying out outstanding research, for faculty positions at the level of Assistant Professor in Economics.

MSc Bursaries at the Economics Department, Queen Mary, University of London

The Economics Department is pleased to offer 3 MSc Bursaries , worth £1500 each for students commencing study in 2006-7. There is no separate application form and all applicants for one of our MSc programmes to commence in the 2006-7 session will automatically be considered. We offer the following Masters programmes: MSc Economics MSc Financial Economics MSc Finance and Econometrics MSc Finance and Investment. Please note that in order to be considered, you should submit you application for entry to the MSc no later than **5 April 2006** .

For further information on postgraduate study in the Economics Department and information on how to apply, please see our web pages at: <http://www.econ.qmul.ac.uk>

Postgraduate Research Studentships at the Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London (United Kingdom)

The Economics Department is pleased to offer 2 full PhD Studentships for students commencing in 2006-7 These awards are tenable for up to three years. The studentships cover tuition fees and provide maintenance at the basic research council level (typically £14,000 during the 2005-2006 session). There is no separate application form: applicants for the MPhil or PhD programme to commence in the 2006-7 session who wish to be considered for the Scholarship should indicate this clearly in the Finance section of the application form. Please note, however, that students already undertaking research at the College are not normally eligible to apply.

In order to be considered, you should submit you application for entry to the MPhil/PhD programme no later than **5 April 2006**

For further information on MPhil/PhD study in the Economics Department and information on how to apply, please see our web pages at: <http://www.econ.qmul.ac.uk>



Visitors at CODE**David WETTSTEIN**

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Research interests

The construction and implementation of new cooperative solution concepts in economic environments, auctions, cost sharing, the properties of extended switching regression models and penalised likelihood methods for model selection.

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Research Interests

Supply Chain Management , Stochastic Inventory Models, Hierarchical Decisions in Dynamic Stochastic Manufacturing Systems , Dynamic and Stochastic Competitive Advertising Models, Optimal Pricing, Development and Maintenance of Software, Decision, Forecast, and Rolling Horizons in Dynamic Optimization Problems.

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**About****CTN**

The Coalition Theory Network (CTN – <http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/index.html>) is an association of eight high level scientific institutions, aimed at the advancement and the diffusion of research in the area of coalition formation. The six current members are: the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (CODE), the Center for Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE), the Équipe Universitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (EUREQua), the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), the Université de Marseille (GREQAM), and the Department of Economics at University of Warwick. At the beginning of 2006 Maastricht University and Vanderbilt University joined the Network.

Members:**:: CODE**

<http://pareto.uab.es/code/>

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