

coalition theory network newsletter

Issue No. 8-2007

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Editorial

by Hubert Kempf, CES-Université Paris I, Banque de France

Dear CTN members, watchers and readers,

It is time to think about packing and booking: the next CTN workshop will take place in Venice in January 2008. It will be organized by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).

The deadline for submitting is November the 18th. It will be hard to outbeat the number of submissions to CTN 07 in Louvain. But the growing recognition of the importance of coalitions and networks in economic life makes me confident that CTN 08 will be as successful as the previous editions and attract a lot of attention.

To give you a taste of what to expect “live” in Venice, read in this newsletter the presentation of the on-going research by Pasini, Pin and Weidenholzer applying network theory to the issue of price dispersion. Interestingly this team plans to bring their theoretical model to the data as two datasets of prices are available to them. The first data set on unleaded gasoline prices in South US cities; the second is on consumer goods sold in 15 Dutch supermarkets.

This is a good example on how coalition and network theory can be brought to real life problems so as to explain daily life phenomena, which still elude understanding.

Hubert Kempf

CALL FOR PAPERS

13th CTN Workshop Integration and Cooperation in Socio Economic Networks and Coalitions

*Venice, Italy
January 24-25, 2008*

FEEM, on behalf of the Coalition Theory Network, will be organising the XIII CTN Workshop in Venice, Italy, on 24-25 January 2008.

This conference will be mainly concerned with the processes of integration, coordination and cooperation in socio-economic networks and groups. Prominent examples are international environmental policy, enlargement and functioning of economic unions, formation and dissolution of trade blocks and custom unions, role of international relation networks in international cooperation. One section of talks will be devoted to contribution in the area of integration and segregation in socio-economic networks; both theoretical and empirical works are welcome. Possible applications range from racial policies to models of cultural (e.g. linguistic) diversity and colonization.

Submissions of contributed papers are due by **November 18th** and the programme will be announced on December 10th. Please send submissions to silvia.bertolin@feem.it. Complete papers are preferred but abstracts are also welcome.

Papers will be selected by a committee consisting of representatives of the nodes of the Coalition Theory Network: Center for Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE) - Université Catholique de Louvain, Department of Economics - University of Warwick, Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (CES) - Université Paris 1, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Center for the study of the Organisations and Decisions in Economics (CODE) - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM) - Université de Marseille, Department of Economics - Universiteit Maastricht, Vanderbilt University.

Further inquiries should be directed to Ms Silvia Bertolin (silvia.bertolin@feem.it).

Please visit the CTN website (www.feem.it/ctn) for updates for this 13th edition, for information about prior CTN workshops, and for further information about the Network.



The CTN Session at PET 07- Presented papers

Nashville, Tennessee– July 6-8 2007

→ Programme & papers at <http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/PET07/>

Enfranchisement, Intra-Elite Conflict and a Weak Median Voter
Eugenio Proto (Warwick University)

Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise a numerically large but weak non-elite as insurance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that even when enfranchisement results in negligibly small changes in the distribution of power between elites and the non-elite, there are discontinuous and dramatic changes in equilibrium surplus distribution among the elites, with the possibility that only a small amount of surplus reaches the newly enfranchised non-elite. We argue that our formal analysis accounts for the stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian democracy and an historical analysis of the democratization of some Western European countries.

Efficiency and stability in a model of wireless communication networks*Sunghoon Hong (Seoul National University)*

We introduce a model of (wireless communication) networks: a group of agents want to communicate with each other. Each agent is characterized by his position in a real space. Then each agent can choose his communication range. Any two agents can directly communicate if each agent belongs to another agent's communication range. Also, they can indirectly communicate if two agents are connected through a sequence of direct communications. Agents can benefit through the communication, but building a communication range is costly. Although efficiency and stability are not compatible in a general context, we identify an interesting subclass of problems where an efficient and stable network exists: the uniform interval model, the uniform circle model, and the communication favorable domain. Also, we investigate the consequence of allowing agents to relocate their positions. As it turns out, for a certain network, relocation-proofness is equivalent to stability.

Collusion in organizations and management of conflicts through job design and authority delegation*Yutaka Suzuki (Hosei University)*

We analyze a three-tier hierarchy with a principal, a supervisor and two productive agents. The agents' efficiency parameters are unknown to the principal (hidden-characteristics element) and perfectly negatively correlated. The supervisor is used by the principal to report which agent is more efficient, but he also has a productive role and may reduce the cost of each agent's task (hidden-action element). We show that, under asymmetric information on the true efficiency of agents and when the task assignment induces future benefits (in terms of possible promotion and reputation enhancement), there exists scope for collusion between the supervisor and the less efficient agent. Then, for some parameters, collusion-proof contracts may be a second best optimal solution, and for other parameters, equilibrium collusion may be optimal. More specifically, allowing vertical collusion (competition for the coalition formation with the supervisor) or allowing its possibility and promoting lateral collusion among agents in equilibrium may be optimal. As a characterization result, the low-powered job for the agent and the high-powered job for the supervisor are derived as a nature of optimal solution in each of the two regimes. Our model endogenously determines who should hold the real authority on the task assignment problem in organizations, and investigates under which conditions authority delegation may improve the overall efficiency.

Article**A network model of price dispersion: Theory and empirical evidence***by Giacomo Pasini, Department of Economics, University of Venice & SSAV, Venice**Paolo Pin, Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste & , Department of Economics, University of Venice**Simon Weidenholzer, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre, University of Wien*

What we observe in everyday life is a stark dispersion of prices for otherwise homogeneous products, and even fluctuations of prices across time for the same product offered by the same seller. The typical answer is that an ice-cream in the desert or in summer is not the same product as an ice-cream in Siberia or in wintertime, i.e. that goods are state contingent. The last answer does however very marginally explain much of the variability observed in the data: a real-data example is that gasoline sold across US cities or a chicken sold in different supermarkets in The Netherlands (see below for a description of the datasets we analyze) display unexplainable price dispersion both along time and across locations. One of the ways that classical economic theory uses to explain the formation of prices imposes strict restrictions: agents are fully informed and homogeneous while firms compete against each others on prices. This is the case known as Bertrand competition. If we assume constant production costs, then every agent is going to pay the lowest marginal production cost. Previous works (Salop and Stiglitz (1977, 1982), Wilde and Schwartz (1979), Varian (1980)) tried to relax the full information assumption, dividing agents between informed and uninformed. They are able to characterize symmetric equilibria, where firms randomize on prices with identical probability distributions. This result is however in contrast with the empirical evidence, where some firms have a greater local market power (think about the only supermarket in a small town) while others are facing much more competitive environments (like the many shopping centres around big cities). It is moreover not correct to consider the previous two environments as separated: many customers living in the small town will have the opportunity to reach the big city, their number will influence the measure in which all of the sellers are imposing prices.

We model our market through a network. This allows the customers to be more heterogeneous on their ability to compare prices: they can be not only either uninformed or fully informed, but also partially informed, because of geographic or opportunity-cost based reasons. Customers' heterogeneity induces also an heterogeneity among firms, that we assume otherwise homogeneous: some of them would face less competition if their potential customers are less informed than those of another firm. Both customers and firms are nodes of the network, the possibility of a customer to compare the prices of a seller will be identified by a link between the customer and the seller in the network. We assume that a firm has information only on the actual number of potential customers that it could attract, and on the probability distribution characterizing the number of links each customer has (i.e. the number of firms whose prices she can compare and whose goods she can buy). We are excluding any other knowledge, from the firms, about the full topology of the network. This assumption seems to be realistic since real world wholesaler normally do not know the shopping habits of each individual consumer, but rely their strategy on survey data. This incomplete information framework motivates the use of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept, as e.g. in Jackson and Yariv (2007).

Finally we plan to test our theoretical model on two datasets, making reasonable assumptions on the shape of the networks under simple characteristics such as town size or population density.

Model description

Formally our environment is characterized by an exogenously given bipartite undirected network, that is a network where nodes are of two distinct types (firms and customers) and each link can only be between a firm and a customer. We do not model informational links between customers, since this case can be replicated connecting them exactly to the same firms. Customers are modelled such that they need at most one unit each of the homogeneous good produced by firms, and to have a reservation price of r for that good. They compare all the prices of the firms they are linked to and buy from the firm offering the lowest price, as long as this price does not exceed the reservation price (in case of a tie, demand is assumed to be randomly equally split). As discussed above we assume the firms to know the probability that any of the customers linked to them has no other links (call this probability q_1), or another link (q_2), or two more (q_3), and so on (obtaining a vector q of probability distribution). Because of this incomplete information firms consider a priori customers to be homogeneous, even if their number of connections will vary across the network. In addition each firm knows the potential number of customers that it can attract (in the language of networks what they know is the degree distribution of customers and their own degree). We assume that firms produce at constant marginal costs (which we set to 0 without loss of generality) and at a homogeneous fixed cost C that they pay only if they are active. We can show that if $C=0$ then the private information (i.e. the customers around each firm) does not affect the optimal strategy of each firm, it means that we cannot exclude symmetric equilibria (at odds with the empirical evidence), and even asymmetric equilibria would not depend on the ex ante heterogeneity we observe. We can also prove that if $q_1=0$ (i.e. all consumers compare at least two prices), then firms make null profit and customers will buy only from large firms (which is also at odds with the empirical results).

We conjecture that the analysis of the remaining interesting case ($C>0$ and $q_1>0$) will lead to an equilibrium where all firms randomize their price, but the probability distribution (both its mean and variance) will be influenced by the number of potential customers. This conjecture is based on previous results (Salop and Stiglitz (1977, 1982), Wilde and Schwartz (1979), Varian (1980)) and the intuition that a firm with n potential customers can surely avoid losses only offering a price which is not below C/n . We stress that, even if the game we consider is a one-shot game, the equilibrium we expect is not in pure strategies, but rather an equilibrium where each firm randomizes strategies. This is the reason why we look for empirical evidence in the time-series data discussed in next section.

Data

Price dispersion is a well-known issue in the empirical literature: dispersion over time is at the basis of time series econometrics, but the same good appear to have different prices even in a cross-sectional sample. We plan to collect two different datasets: the first is an excerpt from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics price series, collected quarterly across US to compute the Consumer Price Indexes. In particular, we focus on unleaded gasoline prices in different cities and non-urban areas in South US: there are 28 years long (1978-2005) quarterly time series available collected in 5 different areas or cities. Even if gasoline sold by different firms are strictly speaking different goods, they are almost perfect substitute.

This first dataset has the major advantage to provide long reliable price series, but it also has two potential drawbacks: the first one is that prices are average prices within each area, e.g. average unleaded gasoline in

Dallas, TX, in a given quarter. Thus we are not really capturing price setting decisions by single firms. The second drawback is that clients could in principle buy gasoline in each area considered, but it is likely that we are capturing non-connected networks given that the surveyed areas could be far away one from the other. If this is the case, gasoline sold in two different areas could be considered as two different goods, and price dispersion explained in terms of contingent goods.

The second dataset we plan to collect overcomes those problems. A Dutch website, (www.supers.nl), publishes daily prices once a month for a set of groceries goods sold in 15 different supermarket chains in the Netherlands. The website is freely accessible, thus in principle clients could compare prices every time they need to shop and behave consequently. While there is evidence that just a small fraction of potential clients do actually behave in this way (see Wildenbeest (2006)), nevertheless supermarket chains considered are spread all around The Netherlands, thus the second drawback of the US dataset do not apply here. Further on, these are not average prices: series are daily and refer to products sold by a particular supermarket.

We plan to analyse those sets of price series separately within a VAR framework, in order to take into account trends and correlation. Series are likely to be correlated, nevertheless we expect to be able to reduce unexplained heterogeneity across price series, but not to cancel it out completely: this would provide empirical evidence on price dispersion supporting our model.

Conclusion

Our project aims at explaining some of the price dispersion observed in real data both along time and across locations, using combined tools from network theory and standard consumer theory. The network models the heterogeneity in information and purchasing possibility of the consumers at one side, and the variability in the number of potential customers on the side of firms.

References

1. Jackson, M.O., and L. Yariv (2007) "Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games", *American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)*.
2. Salop, S., and J. Stiglitz (1977) "Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion", *The Review of Economic Studies*.
3. Salop, S., and J. Stiglitz (1982) "The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Identical Agents", *The American Economic Review*.
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5. Wilde, L.L., and A. Schwartz (1979) "Equilibrium Comparison Shopping", *The Review of Economic Studies*.
6. Wildenbeest, M. (2006) "An Empirical Model of Search with Vertically Differentiated Products", mimeo.

New papers on coalition and network theory

FEEM & CTN Working Papers

60.07

[Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?](#)
Pierre Mouche, Henk Folmer

64.07

[Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds](#)
Matthew Jackson, Benjamin Golub

65.07

In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents*Aljaž Ule, Jacob Goeree, Arno Riedl*

66.07

The Stability of Exchange Networks*Gönül Doğan, M. Van Assen, Amout Van de Rijt, Vincent Buskens*

67.07

Why are Trade Agreements Regional?*Ben Zissimos*

68.07

"Almost" Subsidy-free Spatial Pricing in a Multi-dimensional Setting*Alexei Savvateev, Jacques Drèze, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber*

69.07

The Formation of Financial Networks*Ana Babus*

70.07

A Theory of Strategic Diffusion*Sanjeev Goyal, Andrea Galeotti*

72.07

Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities. An Experimental Evaluation*Gastón Giordana and Marc Willinger*

81.07

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty*Alessandra Sgobbi, Carlo Carraro*

CES Working Papers

17.2007

Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game*Antoine Terracol and Jonathan Vaksman*

25.2007

La gouvernance de la Banque mondiale accorde-t-elle le pouvoir décisionnel aux PID membres de l'OCDE ?*Arthur Foch*

30.2007

How does the design of international environmental agreements affect investment in environmentally friendly technologies?*Basak Bayramoglu*

CODE Working Papers

696.07

Cooperative Production and Efficiency*Carmen Bevia and Luis C. Corchon*

695.07

Frames and Games*Jordi Brandts and Christiane Schwieren*

694.07

The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002)*Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn and Markus Walz*

692.07

Personal Relations and their Effect on Behavior in an Organizational Setting: An Experimental Study*Jordi Brandts and Carles Solà*

689.07

Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence*Klaus Abbink and Jordi Brandts*

683.07

Airline Competition and Network Structure*Ricardo Flores-Fillol***CORE Working Papers**

2007/16

Games with complementarities*Filippo L. Calciano*

2007/21

Returns to foreign languages of native workers in the EU*Victor Ginsburgh and Juan Prieto-Rodriguez*

2007/38

Learning differences in mixed common value auctions*Johanna M.M. Goertz*

2007/39

Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets*Paul Belleflamme and Eric Toulemonde.*

2007/47

"Almost" subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting*Jacques Dreze, Michel Le Breton, Alexei Savvateev and Shlomo Weber*

2007/58

Green consumerism and collective action*Parkash Chander and Subhahini Muthukrishnan***Maastricht University Working Papers**

METEOR RM/07/029

The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division when Preferences are Single-Peaked*Bettina Klaus*

METEOR RM/07/028

Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups*Ernesto Reuben, Arno Riedl*

METEOR RM/07/026

Smith and Rawls Share a Room

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn

METEOR RM/07/025

Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, Toshifumi Nakamura

METEOR RM/07/020

Combinatorial Scoring Auctions

Rudolf Müller, Andrés Perea, Sascha Wolf

METEOR RM/07/018

Dynamic Recontracting processes with Multiple Indivisible Goods

Olivier Bochet, Bettina Klaus, Markus Walzl

METEOR RM/07/013

On The Fastest Vickrey Algorithm

Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, Dries Vermeulen

METEOR RM/07/012

The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002)

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, Markus Walzl

University of Warwick Working Papers

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The Transition to Democracy: Collective Action and Intra-Elite Conflict

Sayantana Ghosal and Eugenio Proto

Vanderbilt University Working Papers

07-W06

Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences

Harold Houba and Quan Wen

Host Institution: CERGE-EI Working Papers

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Valuing a Risky Prospect Less than Its Worst Outcome: Uncertainty Effect or Task Ambiguity?

Andreas Ortmann, Sasha Prokoshcheva, Ondrej Rydval, Ralph Hertwig

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Classic Coordination Failures Revisited: The Effects of Deviation Costs and Loss Avoidance

Giovanna Devetag, Andreas Ortmann

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Learning by Similarity in Coordination Problems

Jakub Steiner, Colin Stewart

More information about CERGE-EI Working Papers can be found at http://www.cerge-ei.cz/publications/working_papers/.

Forthcoming events

by Silvia Bertolin, FEEM

→ Labsi Conference on Political Economy and Public Choice: Theory and Experiments

Certosa di Pontignano, Siena, Italy, 27-29 September 2007

The 2007 Labsi International Conference that will be focused on the issues of Political Economy and Public Choice considered from theoretical and/or experimental perspectives. Experimental methods should be understood in a broad sense, inclusive both of laboratory and field experiments.

Political Economy and Public Choice have been traditionally defined as interdisciplinary fields of study, at the intersection of political science and economics and focusing on the relationship between the political institutions and the economy. The purpose of the conference is to bring together young and established researchers with an interest in these research areas. Topics: Social preferences, Voting behaviour, Social learning and information aggregation, Heterogeneity across individuals and institutions, Rent-seeking, Public goods, Taxation, Monetary and fiscal policies, International political economy.

→ Jornadas Latinoamericanas de Teoría Económica

Medellin, Colombia, 8-10 October 2007

Las Jornadas Latinoamericanas de Teoría Económica (JOLATE) son un encuentro de investigadores en Teoría Económica y Economía Matemática que se realiza cada año con los auspicios de alguna entidad académica latinoamericana. Se trata de que los investigadores presenten sus trabajos recientes para ser discutidos con sus pares académicos.

→ 3rd Ruhr Graduate Summer School on CGE Modelling

Essen, Germany, 8-12 October 2007

The seminar will provide an introduction to general economic equilibrium models and their construction using GAMS and MPSGE. No previous knowledge of GE modeling is assumed. The intended audience is economists and students who want to do policy analysis with real data and economists who are more interested in using numerical modeling for simulation analysis of theoretical models. The seminar is taught in English.

Instructors: David Tarr - The World Bank, Sergey Paltsev - Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Volker Clausen - University of Duisburg-Essen.

→ Dimetic European Doctoral School: Modelling, Systems and Dynamics session

Maastricht, Netherlands, 8-19 October 2007

This week focuses on the local clusters, regional innovation systems and some related topics. Especially it is shown how local clusters can be treated theoretically, with the statistical analyses of spatial data and with the help of cases studies. The concept of regional innovation systems is presented and the local factors that influence the innovativeness within a region are discussed. Finally, the topics of how local circumstances influence entrepreneurship and what role spin-offs play in a region are addressed.

→ 11th Research Conference of the Netherlands Network of Economics

Utrecht, Netherlands, 26 October 2007

The NAKE Day will be held on October 26, 2007 and takes place at the Utrecht University. As in previous years, the NAKE Day will be combined with the Tinbergen Lecture organized by the Royal Netherlands Economic Association.

Paper submission deadline: September, 27.

→ Association of Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET)

Padova, Italy, 1-3 November 2007

The Association of Southern European Economic Theorists is a group of economics departments and economics research centres situated in Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, Turkey and Israel. The purpose of the Association is to encourage the development among the participating centres of programmes of research into economic problems that meet international standards of quality in quantitative economics and econometrics.

→ Behavioural Economics: Challenges to policy makers and financial institutions

Amsterdam, Netherlands, 15-16 November 2007

The topic of this year's conference is: Behavioral Economics: Challenges to policy makers and financial institutions. Insights from psychology and other social sciences have profoundly changed research in economics. After slowly acknowledging the growing real-world and experimental evidence on systematic deviations from full rationality, economists have started to internalize psychological notions and insights into economic analyses. The new insights from behavioural economics necessitate the rethinking of policies in a large number of areas. This applies to both public policy makers as well as private institutions.

The goal of this conference is to bring together researchers from various areas of economics to discuss the current state of behavioural economics science and to explore its implications for households, businesses and public policy makers. David Laibson (Harvard University) and Charles Noussair (Tilburg University) have agreed to be keynote speakers.

→ 5th INFER workshop on Competition Theory and Policy

Mannheim, Germany, 15-17 November 2007

This INFER workshop brings together academics and practitioners to discuss current topics and trends in Regulation and Competition Policy.

The focus of the workshop is on the regulation of infrastructure and its impacts on competition and innovation on downstream markets. Some sessions will be specifically dedicated to telecommunications. Topics of Interest: Economics of Infrastructure Regulation, Platforms and Service Innovation, Network Competition and Innovations.

→ Cesifo Workshop Political Economy

Dresden, Germany, 30 November -1 December 2007

The workshop is jointly organized by the Dresden Branch of the Ifo Institute and the Dresden University of Technology. The two-day workshop will serve as a forum to present current research results in political economy and public choice and will give researchers in these areas the opportunity to network. Both theoretical and empirical studies are welcome.

Paper submission deadline: October, 1.

→ MACROMODELS/AMFET Conference

Warsaw, Poland, 5-8 December 2007

The conference in 2007 is a joint programme activity of the International Association AMFET and EWG MODEST "Modelling of Economies and Societies in Transition". Topics: Modelling Economies in Transition, National Economy Models, Forecasting and Evaluation of Forecasts, EU and EMU Enlargement Issues, Modelling Inflation and Unemployment, Modelling Foreign Trade, Financial Econometrics, Control Theory and Economic Modelling, Input-Output Modelling, OR & Economic Modelling.

→ 8th IWH-CIREQ Macroeconometric Workshop: Structural empirical modelling in macroeconomics

Halle (Saale), Germany, 6-7 December 2007

Transferring economic theory in sound statistical models is still a key issue of applied econometrics. Moreover, it is a necessary condition for useful policy analysis and forecasting.

Thus, the workshop will be a platform to discuss new developments in structural empirical modelling. It is aimed to bring together academic researchers and practitioners. Each topic is opened by a keynote speaker, followed by contributed papers.

Contributed papers should address one of the following topics:

- Optimal monetary policy (Keynote speaker: Jean Boivin)
- Bayesian methods in macroeconometrics (Keynote speaker: Herman van Dijk)

Paper submission deadline: October, 8.

→ XXXII Simposio de Análisis Económico (SAE 2007)

Granada, Spain, 13-15 December 2007

La Asociación Española de Economía organiza el XXXII Simposio de Análisis Económico. Se invita a enviar trabajos de investigación teóricos o aplicados en todas las áreas de la economía para su presentación en dicho Simposio.

→ **44th Annual Conference of the Indian Econometric Society**

Hyderabad, India, 3-5 January 2008

The Indian Econometric Society (TIES) is a registered society under Public Societies Registration Act, formed in 1960. It is one of the oldest and largest body of professional econometricians and quantitative economists with more than 2000 members from all over India and abroad. TIES organises annual conference where experts from all over India and abroad participate and deliberate on various issues. Paper submission deadline: October, 15.

→ **Sunbelt XXVIII - International Sunbelt Social Network Conference**

St. Pete Beach, Florida, USA, 22-27 January 2008

The International Sunbelt Social Network Conference is a major forum for social scientists, mathematicians, computer scientists, ethnologists, and others to present current work in the area of social networks. It provides an opportunity for individuals interested in theory, methods, or applications of social networks to share ideas and common concerns. The International Sunbelt Social Network Conference is the official conference of the International Network for Social Network Analysis (INSNA). Paper submission deadline: October, 7.

→ **XV Public Economics Meeting**

Salamanca, Spain, 7-8 February 2008

The University of Salamanca is glad to invite all the researchers in Public Economics to participate at this new edition of Meetings. The Conference consists of two type of sessions:
Thematic sessions: sessions dedicated to "Economic Policies and Migration"
Free contributions: theoretical or empirical papers in Public Economics.
Keynote speakers: Robin W. Boadway, Salvador Barberà.

→ **Managing Complexity in A Distributed World**

Bangalore, India, 27-31 May 2008

The twenty first century will undoubtedly see the emergence of a variety of complex distributed systems involving nonhomogeneous interacting entities, possessing some computing power, and interconnected with communication networks. Some examples are: wireless sensor networks, content distribution networks, distributed security and surveillance systems, transportation systems, ubiquitous computing systems, integrated power systems, ad hoc and cooperative wireless networks, etc. The design, optimisation, implementation and management of such systems will involve a variety of expertise at all levels. These endeavors will necessarily be inter-disciplinary in nature, thus necessitating researchers to acquire, assimilate and apply knowledge well beyond the boundaries of their core training.

The Conference will serve as a forum to present current work by researchers from around the world, and act as a venue to provide stimulating discussions, resulting in cross-fertilization of ideas from diverse subject areas of electrical sciences, such as computing, communications, networking, signal processing, VLSI design, energy systems, machine learning, and etc. Paper submission deadline: September, 30.

→ **International Economic Association 15th World Congress**

Istanbul, Turkey, June 25-29, 2008

The 15th World Congress of the International Economic Association is being organized by the Turkish Economic Association in Istanbul, Turkey, on June 25-29, 2008. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank will handle the paper-submission process, and collaborate with the IEA President on the organization of the conference program. Research topics: Finance, Labor and Social Issues, Macroeconomics, Microeconomics and Competitiveness, Politics and Institutions, Trade and Integration. Paper submission deadline: February, 1.

→ Visit the CTN Members' seminars web pages

CODE: <http://idea.uab.es/code/workshops.htm>

CORE: <http://www.uclouvain.be/en-43617.html>

CES: <http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/S%E9minaires-GT-Eurequa/seminaire-GT.htm>

FEEM: <http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Seminars/default.htm>

Greqam: <http://greqam.univ-mrs.fr/seminars.php>

Maastricht: <http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/meteor-seminar-et>

Vanderbilt: <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/seminars-research.htm>

Warwick: <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/forums/>

News, Publications and Job announcements**→ Pre announcement: Tenure Track Assistant Professors in Microeconomics, Public Economics, and Behavioral Economics**

The Department of Economics of Maastricht University, The Netherlands, will have job openings for tenure-track assistant professor positions in Microeconomics (especially Economic Theory and Industrial Organization), Public Economics and Behavioral Economics to commence in 2008. Candidates should have a completed or nearly completed PhD in Economics or a closely related subject area, and an excellent record in research and teaching.

More information will be available in due time and can be found at Maastricht's local CTN-website <http://www.personeel.unimaas.nl/b.klaus/CTN.html>

The latest game theory working papers in your mailbox

→ The **nep-gth newsletter** (<http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-gth/>) is a weekly newsletter informing you about the latest additions to the RePEc in the field of game theory. It contains typically 10-15 abstracts, together with links to download the entire paper; it covers papers of over 800 institutions all over the world (including most of the CTN members') and it is free. Subscribe at the lists website (<http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-gth/>). You can contact László Kóczy (L.Koczy@ALGEC.unimaas.nl) with your questions regarding the list.

→ Book: Dynamic Networks and Evolutionary Variational Inequalities (New Dimensions in Networks) by Patrizia Daniele, Edward Elgar, 2006.

<http://supernet.som.umass.edu/bookser/dnevibook.html>

→ Book: Supply Chain Network Economics

by Anna Nagurney, Edward Elgar, 2006.

<http://supernet.som.umass.edu/bookser/scnebook.html>

→ Book: The Structure and Dynamics of Networks

by Mark Newman, Albert-László Barabási, & Duncan J. Watts, Princeton University Press, 2007.

<http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8114.html>

About CTN

The Coalition Theory Network (CTN – <http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/index.html>) is an association of eight high level scientific institutions, aimed at the advancement and the diffusion of research in the area of coalition formation. The six current members are:

- Center for Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE) - Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
- Department of Economics - University of Warwick, UK
- Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (CES) - Université Paris 1, France
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Italy
- Center for the study of the Organisations and Decisions in Economics (CODE) - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain
- Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM) - Université de Marseille, France
- Department of Economics - Universiteit Maastricht, The Netherlands
- Department of Economics - Vanderbilt University, USA

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