October 1st, 2009
2010 Summer School
EAERE-FEEM-VIU European Summer School
The call for applications will be posted on November 2009
Climate Change Negotiations
Venice, July 4th-10th, 2010
The 2010 Summer School will take place from the 4th to the 10th of July in Venice. The theme of this Summer School is Climate Change Negotiations.
Pollution does not respect political boundaries. Classic examples of transboundary pollution include acid deposition, climate change, pollution of the North Sea or the Black Sea, and damage to the stratospheric ozone layer. Transboundary pollution can have regional effects on local ecosystems (e.g., acid deposition in a particular country) or worldwide impacts on global public goods (e.g., biodiversity loss due to climate change). Countries should be working together to address these pollution problems – the responsibility for reducing any risk to local or global goods must ultimately be shared among nations that benefit. The challenge is that although nations have a common interest to protect themselves, they may or may not have a national interest to abate pollution voluntary at a socially optimal level. This creates an incentive for one country to free ride off the abatement effort of other nations because no one can be prevented from enjoying the abatement efforts, regardless of whether they abate or not.
The purpose of the proposed summer school is to describe some of the key issues emerging from the economic analysis of these transboundary pollution, global public good problems, and environmental conflict. We focus on climate change as an important example of a global environmental problem requiring global solutions. The school will have two parts. The first part will be devoted to the theoretical models on international environmental agreements based on game theory. This review of the basic models will be extended to include dynamic models and the analysis of uncertainty on the scope of cooperation. The second part of the school will focus on some of the climate-economy integrated assessment models elaborated to evaluate the effects of different climate policies.
Santiago RUBIO, University of Valencia, Spain (Coordinator)
Lecture topic: Dynamic models of international environmental agreements: A differential game approach.
Scott BARRETT, Columbia University, USA
Lecture topic: Climate treaties.
Carlo CARRARO, University of Venice and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy
Climate policy after 2012. Timing, technology, coalitions: the WITCH model.
Rob DELLINK, Wageningen University, The Netherlands
Lecture topic: Renegotiations in the greenhouse: the STACO model.
University of Exeter Business School, United Kingdom
Coalition formation under uncertainty: The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement.
Andreas LANGE, University of Maryland, USA
The impact of equity-preferences on the stability of international environmental agreements: an experimental approach.
This activity is part of the ESS RESECON project, that has received funding from the European Community's Sixth Framework Programme, Marie Curie Actions - Human Resources and Mobility.
Sole responsibility lies within the author and the Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.